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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO WILLIAM JAMES

The purpose of this theais is an exposition of William
James's theory of the "stream ot thought" as it is developed in
his Principles

~

PsycholoSl, and its relationShip to his later

philosophy ot Radical EMpiricism.

The soope of the thesis is con-

tined to two of the three general tields into whioh the writings

at James tall, namely. the nature of the mind, and the .truoture
and oriteria of knowledge.

The third category, that at religious

belief, has no direot bearing on the thesis topio and therefore
will not be oonsidered.
Since the works at such an extraordinary man as William
James cannot be properly understood, or his diffioultie. and
problems properly appreoiated, without a briet study of his baokground, interests, and characteristics, we will tirst take up a
study of James the man and his approach to psyohology_
William James was born in the year 1842 of a wealthy
lew York tamily_

He spent DlUoh ot his boyhood, however, in

Europe, and thus he acquired trom the beginning a defin1tely oosmopolitan outlook.

Prom hi. father, Henry James, Sr., William

reoeived a lasting intereat in religion and religious questions.
1

2

The elder Jame., a man of leisure with a definitely independent
mind in matters of religion, devoted muoh ot his time to theologioal work ••
The earliest peroeptible influenoe on William James,
however, was not religion but art.

His interest in painting was

shortlived and was superseded by an attraction to the field of
science.

James reoeived his M.D. from HArvard in 1869, and began

his teaohing oareer there tour years later as instruotor in
anatomr and physiology.

This position, however, opened the door

to still another, and in 1876 he organized the first psyohologioal laboratory at Harvard.
work, Prinoiples

2!

Fourteen years later, his outstanding

PSloholoSl, appeared.

Its remarkable lucces.

established him as the leading psychologist of this oountry.
Here again Jamestl varying career took another turn.

Even before

the publioation ot the Prinoiplel, hil interest in PS7chologJ
began to wane, and he grew more and more attraoted to philosophy.
Hi. last years were spent in attempting to develop a systematic
philosophy, Which he termed Radical Empiricism.
Prom this brief sketch we can see several oharacteristics of James, the most obvious ot whioh are his restles. nature
and his widell diversified interests.

BVen a oursorl reading ot

hi. work. reveals that James was a deepll religious man, though
this trait found expres.ion more in hi. kindne.s to men than in
his devotion to God.

Hot only his father's k.en interest in

matters religiOUS, but also, and muoh more striking" his strong

3
independence or mind showed up in the son.

William, a voracious

reader, shows the inrluence or a great number or philosophers and
psychologists, though he steadfastly refused to accept
the position of anyone ot them.

~ ~

As Perry says, "James benetited

by the new movements in German, Prenoh, and English psyohology
without surrendering himself wholly to any ot them."l

T.ne early

attraotion ot James to art shows still another taoet ot his
nature.

We perceive time atter time when reading his works that

James was basically an

artist~

a man with an imaginative tlair,

a man given to brilliant flashes of intuition rather than to the
rigorous and orderly rea80ning ot a scientist or a philo8opher.
James tound it impossible to tie himself down to lengthy laboratory experiments or to the working out ot problems recurrent in
his thought.

ae left the laboratory work to his assistants, and

borrowed extensively trom the thought ot others whenever he was
forced to solve a particular philosophic problem.

B1. strength

lay rather in his ability to popularize and .ynth.size, and it
was he more than any other who made psychological and philosophic
problems understandable by the non-academic world.
The literary atmosphere ot the James home, combined
with the abundant opportunities tor m.eting the writers and the
thinker. ot his day, stimulated William's mind to extensive
1 Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character ot
William Jame., Brieter Veraion, CambrIdge, Kaii7, 1948, 182:-

4
reading.

That he was greatly influenced by the .en whose works

he had read is obvious trom allot his writings, but especially
trom the Principles.

The doctrines ot such men as Helmholtz,

WUndt, Fechner, and Stumpt, ot the German school; ot Oharcot and
Janet ot the French school; ot Bain, oarpenter, J. S. Hill,
Darwin, and Spencer, ot the British group tigure prominently in
Jases'a psychology.2

Their ideas were assimilated by James, and

reappeared bearing the stamp ot his own approach and characteristics.

This approach consisted primarily, as Knox says, in "a

strong sense ot individual values,") tor "Jamests philosophy was
a study ot man, or ot lite."4 He did not regard biolo87,
medicine, psyohology, philosophy, or religion as so many independent, abstract disciplines, but as valuable sources ot light and
information on human nature.S

Bis "strong sense ot individual

values," comm.nts Mr. Knox, ". • • must have tound expression
under any circumatancea~ but the advent ot Darwinism gave to hi.
mind the precise scientitic cue that it required."6

The intlu-

2 Gardner Murphy, B1atorical Introduction to Modern
Psychology, New York, 1949, 192.
--

3 H. V. Knox, The Philosophy ot Willlam James, New
York, 1914, 3.
-

4 Ralph Barton Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencles,
New York, 1925, 350.
S

6

Ibld., 350.
-Knox,
3.

.

enoe ot Darwin in Ja.es's psychology, aooording to the same
writer,

n

• • • consista primarily in a special applioation to

animal and human consoiousne.s ot the Darwinian conception ot
biological utility."7
J . .e. was not, however, the first to apply the conoept

ot evolution to the explanation ot the human mind.

Herbert

Spencer had preceded him in this in his treatment of the lite ot
the mind as a process ot oontinuous adjustment to its external
enVironment.

But Spenoer had detined adjustment as adaptation,

thus a •• igning a pa.sive role to the mind.
sented vigorousl,.

To this James dis-

He too stres.ed Darwin's theory ot accidental

or spontaneoua variation, but he denied that this variation was
to be attributed to environment alone.

Hi. position, characteri'

tically empirical, was that the tact. ot psychology could not be
explained without restoring to the mind that .pontaneous productivity which Spencer had ignored. 8
7 Ibid., 9. Mr. Knox hal a briet but helpful comparison ot Darwin and James: "The secret ot Darwin's scientific
succes. was his firm grasp ot the prinCiple that a genuine explanation of biological phenomena can only be given in biological
ter.. ; and that, .are particularly, an explanation ot organic
evolution must be couched in terms of the interest of the
organism. Bow .the pursuance of tuture enas, and the choice ot
means for their attainment, are the mark and criterion of the
presence of mentality in a phenomenon.' B7 conneoting this with
the Darwinian standpoint, the soiences ot biology and psyohology
can be rendered essentially continuous."

8 Lloyd Morris, William James, Xew York, 1950, 15.

6

.

Thus we see the influence ot two men, the one a soientist and the other a philosopher, on James the psychologist.
From the scientist he took his approach to psyohology, adapting
the theory and methods of biologJ with scarcely any change but
that necessary tor the application of the theory of evolution to
the mind prooess.

From the philosopher he took the idea of

applying this theory of evolution to psychology, but ohanged the
method ot application to agree with his own position on the
nature ot the mind.
James was similarly influenoed later in his oareer by
other thinkers and writera.

For example, the solution to his

tamous "apiritua1 criaia" was lnapired by Renouvierta second

--_

--

Essaia, as James tells us in his work The Will to .................
ae1leve. 9 And
again in hia laat series of lectures, published under the title
Pluralistic Universe, he found the solution to a aerious philo-Asophie
di1emma10 in the writings ot aenri Sergson. l1 In the
aame series of 1eotures we learn that James was led to eonalder,
under the intluence ot Pechner, the plausibility ot a "world
soul," or, at least, of some higher torm of consciousness. 12
9 Perry,!he Thought and Character of William James,
Brieter Version, 121:-----

10 Either to give up the logic ot identity, or to
accept human experience as tundamentally irrational.

1943,.

11

214.

--------

William Jame., A Pluralistic

~Un_i~v_e_r_s_e,

Xew York,

7

.

We have thus leen Jame. taking his oue trom Darwin,
following the path ot Spenoer (though disagreeing with him in
many partioulars), and tinding the solution ot several major
proble.s in the writing. ot Renouvier, Bergson, and Feohner.
These are but the outstanding examples ot the influence ot other
men on his own thought and writings, and yet, in spite ot the
large place whioh must be given to these men, James developed a
number ot theories which were deoidedly his own.

AmOng these

were his "stream ot thought," his theory on the emotions, and his
theory ot "pure experience," which waa so fundamental a point in
hi. philo.ophy ot Radical Empirioism.

It is the opinion ot his

out.tanding commentator, Ralph Barton Perry, that the "stream ot
thought" theory takes tirst place among his speoitically p.yohological dootrines, and, with the possible exception ot his
theory ot the dependence ot knowledge on the Will, the "stream ot
thought" actually stands as James's most important philosophio
insight. 1)
The purpose of this thesis is, as we have stated, a
study ot the relationship between the "stream ot thought" and the
basic tenets ot James's later philosophy ot Radical Empirici8m.
That suoh a relationship exists 1s indicated by the tollowing
analySi8 ot Dr. Perry:
James's theory ot knowledge was developed trom this psy-

1)

Perry, 195.

8
ohological standpoint, and ia throughout dominated by
ita two main charaoteristics: its emphasis on the categoriea of interest and practicel and its reduotion or
relations, substances, aotivities, and other alleged
transcendent elements to the continuiti.s of sens. experienoe. The former motive in Jame.'s thought led to
his voluntarism and pr~gmati.ml the latter to hi.
'radical empirIoi.m.'L4
In order better to understand the theory ot "stream ot
thought," we will now con.ider briefly Jame.'. approaoh, methods,
and u.e of term. in the Prinoiple.

2!

Psyohology.

James detines psyohology at the beginning of hi. work
as fta .cienoe ot mental lite, both ot its phenomenon and its oonditions."lS

It may be noted here that this is not the etymologi-

cal detinition ot the word.

CPLJ'x", llY6 S

In the original Greek, the words

mean "study ot the soul."

James, however, strong-

ly objected to the "orthodox spiritualistic theory" ot the soul,
according to which the diverse mental modes are atfiliated with a
"simple entity, the personal Soul, ot which they are taken to be
so many tacultative manite.tatlons."16

Though James objects to

14 R. B. Perry, Philosophy of the Recent past, Hew
YO:1-k, 1926, 186.
- - - lS William Jame., Prinoiple.

~

PSlcholoSl, 1950, I, 1

16 Ibid., 1. Ot. I, 214 and 342-350 for discussion or
the "soul theory," and its rejeotion. That James was tamiliar
with the traditional scholastio explanation ot the soul is evIdent from these pages. Bis source, however, seems to be
Oartesian rather than scholastic tor the explanation which he
tollows (and rejects) divides all being into :1-es extensa, the
phYSical, and res cOlitans, the mental. In the-ratter, two elements are distinguIs ea: an aotive thinker, or soul; and the substanoe ot the soul's thoughts, or oonsoiousness.

"psyohologJ with a soul," he objeots Just as strongly to the
assooiationist theory ot Herbart, BUme, the Mills, and Baln,
namely, "psyohology without a loul."
mental phenomena by oommon elements

This group tried to explain
~

the divers. mental taotl

rather than by a common agent behind them.

To James, neither

position was satiltaotory beoauae neither .xplained auch problems
as why our memory olinga more easily to the near than to the
remote, or why our memory Ihou1d lose its grasp ot proper names
sooner than abltract. 1 7
Sinoe psyoho10gy is "a loienoe ot mental lite," the
next question to be determined il that ot the presence ot mental
lite.

Oonoerning this question James says, "The pursuance ot

tuture ends and the ohoiee ot .eans tor their attainment are • •
the mark and oriterion ot the presenoe ot mentality In a
phenomenon. MlB
!he solence of psychology, 11ke Any other natural
soianoe, assumes oertain data unoritically, namely, "that
thoughts sucoessively occur, and that they know objeots In a
world whloh the psychologist also knows. n19

In other words, the

psyohologist .ssumes a "thorough-going duallsm."20

..

17

~

IB

~.,

3.
B.

19 Ibid. , 197.

-

20 Ibid., 21B.

He supposes

10

two elements, a mind knowing and a thing known, and treats the.
as irreducible.

At the time ot writing the Prinoiple., James was

detinitely committed to dualism, though Perry says, "This dualism
was a provisional doctrine by whioh James the psychologist hoped
to eliminate and postpone a question on whioh Jame. the philosopher had not made up his mind. "21

The "question" to whioh

Perry refers was mentioned by James early in his writing when he
distinguished between the assumptions ot a man as a psyohologist
and "whatever monistic philosophy he may, as an individual who
has the right also to be a metaphysician, have in reserve."22
Concerning the use ot oommon terms in the Prinoiple.,
Jame. had no one word for all states ot consoiousness as such.
Expresaions like "mental atate," "state ot oonsoiousness," and
"subjective condition" he tound too cumbersome.

A word such as

"teeling" vas, he felt, too often taken as a srnonym ot "sensation," a. opposed to thought, and the words "idea" and "thought"
were commonly taken to exolude sensation.

In this quandary,

James oould make no defInite ohoice, though he preterred either
"teeling" or "thought," and so he stated that he would otten

US8

21 Perry, The Thou~t and Character ot William James,
Boston, 1935, II, 72.Tn anot er place Perry saYS, "In the
P8{CholoSlohe had allowed himself the conveniences ot dualism,
DU the w le trend ot his philosophical thought, both betore and
atter the publication ot the PSiohologz, had been against that
proviSional make.hitt." Ibid., ,273.
22

James, Principles, I, 220.

11
both ot theae words in a wider aense than usual to indicate any
state ot conaciousnesa. 23
With this brier introduction to William James, we can
more tully understand his problems and better realize his unique
position aa pioneer in the field or American psychology.

By way

both of aummary ot th1s ohapter and introduction to the next, we
may oite the historian Joa.ph L. Blau:
James's psyohology marked a radioal shift in psychological perspective and furnished a basis for an equally
radioal ohange in phi 10 sophi 0 emphasis. The shitt was
trom a psychology which stressed the mechanical assooiation ot similar ideas to one in which mind was a dynamio
and tunctional instrument ot adaptation to the environ.ent. Jamea's psychology broke down the separation between mind and body by considering what had been traditionally called 'mind' as man's conscious, intellectual
behavior, and what had traditionally been called tbody'
as the biological context in which this behavior take.
place. Thus his work provided a psychological basis tor
the overthrow ot the dualism ot mind and matter which
had been the starting-point ot most 'modern' philo8ophy.~

23 ...........
Ibid., 186 •
~ Joseph L. Blau, Men and Movement. in American
Philosophy, H.w York, 1952, Sl~---

OBAPfBft II

!BE STREAM OF !HOUGH'l' III !1'BE PSYCHOLOGY
OP WILLIAM JAMES

AIIong "&lU.ts sp.citicall,. Pl1choloSical doctrinel, as
we hay. laid, the "stre" ot thought" ma1 be considered hi. outstanding dev.lop••nt. l l ..el begins hi. Itud,. ot the mind trom
within with an anal,.lia ot the tact ot thinking, tor, he aa,.8,
"The tirlt taot tor u. • • • al pa7ohologilts il that thinking ot
10• • • ort

goea on."2 .e il uling the word "thinking" here indis.

criminatel,. tor ev.r,. tora ot cognitive operation.
Proceeding empiricall7 in hil anal,.sil, Jamel not ••
tiv. characteristicI ot the proc.11 ot th1nkinSl that .ver,.
thought ..... to b. part ot a perlonal conloiouln.ls, that
thought il alwa,.1 changing within each perlonal con.oioulnell;
that thought 11 I.n.ibl,. oontinuou. within .ach perlonal conIciousn.ls, that it alwa,.s appears to d.al with obJ.cts ind.pen-

1 P.rr,., The !houset
Bri.ter Verlion, 19S;--

2 Jamel, PrinCiple.

~

Charact.r !! William James,

2! PI,.choloil, I,
12

2~.

13
dent of it.elt. and that it 1. int.rested in .ome parts ot the.e
objeot. to the exoluaion ot other•• 3
Taking up hil tir.t pOint, Ja.ea atate., "It ..... aa
it the ele.entary p.yeh1o tact Were not thought or

~

thought

or ~ thought, but !l. thought, ever,. thought being owned."4 1'0
plyohologJ, theretore, can que.tion the exiltenoe ot peraonal
aelve •• S lamel denie. that the notion ot peraonality oan .ean
anything elsentially ditterent fro. what ia tound in the .tre. .
ot thousht.

Oonlequently he doe. not oonaider the abnormal oa.ea

ot auboon.cioua perlonality, .uch •• thoae brought to the tore by
hypnoti •• and automatic writing, to pertain to the pre.ent Itudy_

Btl reaaon 1. that in the.e abnormal oalea, the tracta ot thought
indioate an organized ".eoond-selt" with ••mory, habit., and .en••
ot 14entit,..
What Jame. mean. 01 hi. .eoond charaoteri.tio ot
thought 1. that "no .tate once lone can recur and b. Identioal
wlth what it was betor•• "6
......n.ation twic..

In other word., we never get the

W. might think that we do, but upon olo ••r

inapection, "what i. got twice ia the aam. object."7 The rea.on

-Ibid. ,
-Ibld. ,

.3 Ibid. , 225 •

4
5

6
7

-Ibld ••
-Ibid. ,
-

226.

226.
230.
2.31.

why we cannot get the same sensation twice is that "tor an identical sensation to recur it would have to oocur the second time
But this, strictly speaking, is a physio
logical impossibility.u8 Bow it this is true in oonneotion with
in an unmodified brain.

sensations,

~

.t.o_r_t.l0.r.i. it 1s true 1n connection with thoughts.

Every thought we have ot a given fact is, strictly
speaking, unique, and bears only a resemblance ot kind
with our other thoughts of the same tact. When the
identical fact r.ecurs, we must think ot it in a tresh
manner, s.e it under a somewhat ditterent angle, apprehend it in difterent relations from those in which it
last appeared.9
It is this theory. based on physiological data, that made it imPossible for James to tollow either Locke or :Serbart, who "tormulate the mental tacts 1n an atomistic sort of way. and • • •
treat the higher states ot con.ciousness as if they were all
built out ot unchanging ide& •• "lO

They held that Uit the thing

is composed ot parts, then we must suppose that the thought of
the thing is oompo.ed ot the parta 1n thought • • • If the thing
i •• imple, ita thought i. aimple."ll
Meanwhile a neoesaary consequenoe ot the beliet in permanent selt-identical psychic facts that absent themselves and recur periodicallT is the BUmian dootrine

8

~ ••

2321 ct. also 480.

9

~.,

233.

10 Ibid.,

236.

11

-Ibid.,
-

237.

lS
that our thought 1s oomposed of separate 1ndependent
parts and 1s not a .ensibly oontinuous stream. That thia
dootrine entirely misrepresents the natural appearanoes
is what I next shall try to show. 1 2
James begins hi. disoussion of the third oharaoteristic
of thought by a quasi-definition of the word "continuous."
is "that Whioh is without breach, crack, or division."l)

It
The

onll two breaohes that we oan oonceive to occur within a mind are
either "interruptions, time-1!2! during which the consciousness
went out altogether to eome into existenoe again at a later
1I1Oment"J or "breaks in the g,ualitl, or content, of the thought,
so abrupt that the ses-ent that followed had no conneotion whatever with the one that went before."14 !be MOst common time-gap
is the fact of sleep, but there are others, suoh as those produced by anesthetics and drugs, in all of which there is definitely telt a continuity of aelt.

!hat is why "a present thought,

although not ignorant of the time-gap, oan still regard it.e1f as
continuous with certain chosen parts of the past.MlS
Consoiousness, then, doe. not appear to itself ohopped
up in bits. Such words as • chain' or 'train' do not
desoribe it fitll as it presents its.lf in the first
instanoe. It is nothing jOinted; it flows. A 'river'
or 'stre. . ' are the metaphors bl wnioh it is most natu-

-Ibid. ,

12 Ibid., 2)7.
13

237.

14 Ibid. , 239.
1S Ibid. , 239.

-

16
rally d.scribed. In talking ot It hereatter, let us call
It the stream
thought, ot consoiousness, or ot subjeotive lite. l

gt

The second type ot break among the thoughts which have the same
sense ot belonging together 1. produced "by sudden contrasts in
~

gualitl ot the suco.ssive segm.nts ot the stream ot

thQught."11

In Jam.sts opinion, one who would maintain that

the •• contrasts, how.v.r violent, break the continuity ot the
stream of thought are guilty .lther ot "oontuslon" or ot a
"superfiolal Introsp.ctlve vi.w. n1 8

This observer would contuse

the thoughts th.... lv.s, taken as .ubj.ctiv. tacts, and the
thlnga, tak.n as their objects.
!he transition between the thought ot on. object and the
thought ot another Is no more a break 1n the thoufht
than a j01nt in a bamboo Is a br.ak in the wood. t 1.
a part ot the conSCiousness as much as the joint 1. a
part ot the bamboo. 9
Jame. also places In the category ot superficial those who tall
to not. that the previous object ot our consciousness Is taken
together with the pre ••nt object.

Hence, tor example, when a

clap ot thunder breaks the silence, the object ot our oonsoiousn.ss is not the thunder alone, but "thund.r-breaklng-upon-

Ibid., 239 •

16

............

11

Ibid., 239.

18 Ibid.,
19

240.

Ibid., 240 •
............

17

.
• 11.ne.-and-oontrast1ng-with-it."20

In .upport ot this .tata-

••nt, he reter. to hi. ohapt.r on n.rvou. aotiv1ti •• , wh.re he
demonstrated that no _tate ot the bra1n can ba suppo.ed instantly
to d1e away.21 Be admit., how.ver, var10u. rate. ot changa in
the stre. . ot oon.ciou.ne.s.
"where

.v.~

The.e are .hown by language 1t.elt

thought 1 • •xpr••••d in a .entence, and ev.rl .en-

teno. clo •• d by a period."22 ae compare. thi. phenom.non ot
change in consoiousness to a b1rd'. lite, tor "it s .... to b.
made ot an alternation ot t11ght, and perch1ng •• "2) Enlarging on
thi, compari.on, h. g1v•• the tollowing .xplanation.
!h. re.ting-plac.s ar. u8ualll occup1ed by .en.orial
1m.gination. ot 80m•• ort, who.e peculiarity 1s that
they can be held betore the mind tor an ind.tinite t1me,
and oontemplated without ohanging; the places ot tllght
are till.d w1th thoughts ot r.lation" statio or dynamic, that tor the most part obtain between the matters oontemplated in the period. ot comparativ. r.st.
Let u. call the r •• ting-place. the '.ubstantive
parte,' and the plao.s ot Ilight the 'traneltiv. part.,t
ot the stream ot thought.24

Jamee admit. the great ditticultl In analyz1ng the.e tran.itive
parte! but h. do., not tor that reason d.nl their exi.t.nc., or
reduce the. to the more .ubstantive part., as .anl have done.

20

~.,

240,

ct. Franz Brentano, PSlchologi., I, 219

21 J .... , Princlpl.s, I, 242J ot. !aine, On Intelli·
sence, .ew York edition, I, ~J.
--

22

J . .e.,

Prinoiple., I,

23 ...........
IbId., 244 •

24

Ibid.,
..........

243 •
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Ue 8ay., "It there be such things as f.e11ngs at all, then so
surely, and more surely, do ree11ngs ex1st to wh10h these relat10ns are known."2$

-

There are tee11ngs ot color, ot oold, 1t 1s

true, but there are also re.llngs ot

!!,

ot

~, ot~.

Why 1s

1t that language reoogn1zes the tormer but refuses to reoognize
the latter?

The tormer ree11ngs are what Jame. calls substant1ve

the latter, trans1t1ve.

He clalms that men perslst 1n the error

that where there 1s no name, no ent1ty can ex1st.

Consequently

they have elther den1ed the trans1t1ve states or have named the.
atter the 8ubstantive percept10n to whioh they lead, thus
bring1ng about greater and greater accentuat10n and lsolat10n ot
the substant1ve parts. 26
There are other modir10ation. ot oonsc10usne.s ex1.t1ns
and, upon oareful analysis, even recognized, but the.e are
generally treated In the .ame tash10n as the trans1t1ve states.
"The ord1nary way 1. to assume that theT are all empt1nes.es ot
oonsc1ousness, and so the sa.e state.

But the teellng ot an ab-

-

.ence is toto .......
coelo
other than the absence ot a te.llng."27
.;;,;;;....
2$

Ibid., 24$.
-James
considers th1s denial ot the transitive

26
state. and the consequent accentuat10n ot the substant1ve state.
to be the fundamental error common to both the assoc1ation1sts
and the "sp1rltua11sts." Llkew1s., he considers hi. Ins1ght into
thi. matter ot utmost Importanoe in h1. own explanation ot mental
phenomena.
27

Jame., Principles,

I~

252.
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These tendenoies are what Jame. call. the "tringe" or "p.ychic
overtone.,"28

and it i. preoi.ely the.e tendenoie. which con-

stitute the ditterence between "acquaintance w1th" and "knowledge about" a thlng. 29

The tormer ia knowledge without these

psychic overtonea, the latter, knowledge with such overtones.
The tourth characteristio at human thought 1s that lt
appears to deal wlth objects lndependent ot it.elt.

OUr oommon-

sense induces us to acoept the extra-mental exi.tenoe ot the obJeots ot our mind because we perceive that "there are .anI

-

human thought., each wlth the aame objecta."30 In oonneotion
wlth knowledge by the mind ot obJecta independent ot ltaelt,
James takes up tor discusslon what he con.lders two erraneau.
opinion..

The tirst i. that retlective consoiousness ot the

s.lt is essential to the oognltive !unotlon ot thought.

In other

word., the mind, in order to know, must expre.sly distingu1sh
between the th1ngs which lt know. and It.elt.

28

Ibid.,
-Ibid.,

Tbi. opinion Jame.

2$8.

29
259J ct. 221, also, Wl11iam James, The
MeaniEj ot Tru~ew York, 1932, 11: quoting John orote;-lip 10 ratIO PhilosoShica, London, 1865, 60: "We may speak in a
double manner ot ~e 'obJeot. ot knowledge. That 11, we maT
either use language thus: we know a thing, a man; or we maT us.
it thus: we know such and sucll'lli1ngl about the thing, the un.
Language in general, tollow1ng lta true logical lnstinct, dlstlngui.hed between t~.se two appllcatlon. ot the notion at knowledge,
the one being Y-VW-V"I., nosoere, kennen, connaitre) the other
being £.t cJ~vO(, .. , SCire, wil.en, .avoir."
30 l ..el, Principle., I, 211.
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denle. when he aay., "Thought may, but need not, In knowIng, d1.crlqinate betw.en 1ta object and itselt."31 Secondly, he objects
to the misus. ot the word "objeot" by those who take It to ind1cate only the ".ubetantl •• kernal or nucleus ot con.olou.n•••• "32
For example, In the .enteno. "Columbus dIscovered America in

1492," most people would say that the object ot the qind Is the
word "Oolumbus," or
America."

~Amerloa,"

or, at most, "the discovery ot

Jame. maintain. that it Is not anyone ot the.e taken

sIngly, but the whole .entence.

"!he objeot ot every thought,

then, 1. neither more nor le.s than all that the thought thInks,
exactlT as the thought think. It, however complicated the matter
, •• may be."33

Thi. brings up again the qu•• tion ot a complex

objeot ot thought and the assooiationist doctrine that whenever
an object ot thought contains many elements, the thought it.elt
must be made up ot ju.t .s many ide •• , one ide. tor each element,
and all tu.ed together in appearance but .eparate in reality.34
J~e.,

again, denies thia, .aying that "however complex the ob-

ject may be, the thought or it i. one undivided atat. ot consciousnes •• "3S

31

32

Ibid.,
...........
IbId.,
...........

27$.
275.

Ibid., 275.
33 .-........
IbId., 2771 ct. a180 II, 14.
34 ...........

3$ Jam•• , Princlpl •• , I, 276.
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the tlnal oharaoterlatl0 ot the atream ot oonaolouane ••
1. that "It 1. alwa7a Intere.ted more In one part ot ita object
than In another, and weloome. and rejecta, or ohooaea, all the
while it thinks. ".36 Our .enae. are nothing more than organs ot
.eleotion, pioklng out ot what i. an "undistingui.hable, avarmin,
oontlnuum, devoid ot distinction, • • • a world fUll ot contra.ta
ot aharp accenta, ot abrupt ohan,e., ot pioture.que light and
.bade.".37 Prom among the.e ••n.atlon., the mind ohooses agaln,
.electing "certaln ot the .enaationa to repre.ent the thins most
trull, and eon.idering the re.t a. ita appearan.e., moditied b7
the conditions ot the mo.ent."38

!he perception. ot indiv1dual

.en ditter a. to preoi.e17 what each one perceive. beoau.e ot the
dltterenoe. 1n experience and in habits ot attention, but 1n
general the whole human race agrees In noticing, .eleoting, and
naming oertain detinite portlons ot "the orIginal world-stutt."39
The one out.tanding oa •• ot oomplete diversIt7 in •• leotion 1.
the .plltting ot the univer.e 07 each indivldual into two halv•• ,
name 17, "me" and "not-.e."40 11nee only the to~.r pertaina to
36
37
38
.39
40

Ibid.,
-Ibld.,

284.

Ibid. ,
-Ibid.
-Ibid.,,

28$.

-

285.
289 •
289.
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a "stud1 ot" the mind trom wlthln."41 Jame. proce.da to study the
"me" br a ayate..tlc, empirioal 1nve.tlgat10n ot the meaning of
"In It. wld•• t poa.lble aen.e, a man'. Self i. the aum
total of all that he can call hla."42

Benoe a man can b. aaid to

have a material aelt--hia bodr and all hi. pOI.e.sions, a aocial
•• It--the recognition whioh he receives trom hi. assooiates; a
spirltual selt--the p.rabie taoultles taken conoretely, and,
tinally, what Jamel call. the "Pure Ego" or prinolple ot perlonal
unlty.

The scope of the word 1n the flrat two c•• e. i. obvlou••

The use of the word "selt" accordlng to the thlrd and tourth
meanlnga, which expresa more properly what we mean when we uae
the word, calla tor oaretul investigatlon.
The "splrltual aelt" ma1 be consldered elther abstraotly, accordlng to Its divlslon Into facultlea, or concretely, aa
elther the entire atre. . of peraonal consciousne •• or the present
".egment" or " ••ction" ot that atream.

Jame. propoae. to con-

alder thia "aelt" abatractly first, In order to tind out which
portlon of the stream --7 be taken a. a nucleua ot the 8ubjective
11fe a. a whole.

Be will take up later a dlscu.alon ot the

".elf" In Its conorete aspect, when he dlscu•• e. the nature or
Ibld.,
..........

2~ •

~.J

291.
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the prlnclpl. ot unlty ln our con.clou.n••••
In con.ld.rlng the "splrltual .elt" ab.tractly, mo.t
men would d•• crlb. lt ln the .... way--up to a polnt.

"Th.y

would call it the activ. elem.nt in all con.clou.n••• , .aying
that • • • there 1. a splrltual .omething in him which aeem. to

S2

~

to meet theae qualities and content., whil.t they .eem to

--

come in to be recelved by It."43

trOll.

HOwever, once they de.cended

thia general de.criptlon to partlcular characteri.tica,

their opinion. would begin to ditter.
50.e would aa1 that it i. a .imple active .ub.tance, the
.oul, of which they are thua con.cioul, other., that
th.re ia nothing but • tiction, the imaginary beins
denoted by the pronoun 11 and betwe.n th••• extremel.pt
opinlon, all lort. ot inter.aedlarlel would b. tound.44
JaDlel mainta1na that thi. central part ot the ".elt" is felt,
that "it il something w1th which we al.o have direct sen.ible
acqua1ntance,"4S but linee h1s knowl.dge ot thla "aelt" i.
arrived at by his personal introspection and ma,. theretore be, in
part at least, inapplicable to other lndivldual., he propose.
He i8 most distlnctly aware ot
"the collection ot the.e peculiar motlona in the head or b.twe.n

only hi. teeling in this _tter.

the h.ad and the throat."46

43

44
45
46

-Ibid.,
Ibid. ,
-Ibid.
,

-Ibld. ,
-

297.
298.
300.
301.

B. does not claim that this i8 all

-

that the "selt" consiats ot, but It the other portlona whioh are
al 7et hldden are a1m11ar to thia ot whioh he 1. aware, then "It
would tollow that our entire teellng ot apiritual actlvity, or
what common17 paaae. D7 that name, i. real17 a teellng ot bodl17
activltle. who.e exact nature 1. by mo.t men overlooked."47
Since this il a. tar •• he can 80 In an analy.ls ot the "aplrltual selt" 1n It. ab.tract alpect, he turn. now to a stud7 ot the
emotlon. ot the ".elt."
There exl.tl, aay' James, "an hlerarohical scale, with
the bod117 Selt at the bottom, the splritual .elt at top, and the
extraoorporeal materlal lelvea and the various .ooial .elvel between."48

Purther analYB1. ot the.e "aelve," In a man ahows that

"each ot UB is animated by a direct teeling ot regard tor his own
pure principle ot individual existence, whatever that mal be,
taken merely as such."49 !he questlon immediately ari.est what
1a this "principle ot individual existenoe"?

It cannot be the

inner nucleua ot one's spirltual .elt, that oollection ot obacurely telt "adjuatments", nor can it be the concrete stream ot
one-s thought, nor oan it be the indivisible

...

Soul~.ubstancel

nor

oan it be the mere pronoun II tor none ot th.se arouse te.ling
301 •

48

Ibld.,
...........
Ibld.,
...........

49

Ibld.,
...........

318 •

47

313 •

and connote emotlonal worth.

What Is It then?

James concludes

that "lts own body, • • • first ot all, its friends next, and
tinally its splrltual dispositlons, must be the supremely Interesting objeots for each human mind."50

And agaln, "H1 own body

and what minlsters to Its needs are thus the primitive objeot,
instinctlvely determined, of my egoistic Interests."Sl
After thls lengthy Investigatlon of the phenomenal self
and the nature of self-regard, Jame. begins his study ot the
"pure prinolple ot personal identitl."52 Here he comel direotly
agalnst one of the most dlfficult problems of his psychology, a
problem whioh had divided all prevlous psyohologists into two
irreconcilable caaps.

On

the one aide were the "splrituallsts,"

who held either a substantial soul or a transcendental principle
ot Identlty; on the other slde, the "assooiationists," who denied
this principle, and held that all it amounted to waa a stream of
passlng thoughts.

James saw dlfficultles in both positions: the

former gave no posltive acoount of what the soul or the transcendental princlple might be, the latter contradicted the commonsense of all mankind.53

SO
$1

52
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-Ibld.,
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James recognlzed the dltflculty ot the investigation.

...

tor he state •• "The I. or 'pure ego.' ls a very much more dltticult .ubject ot Inquiry than the ......
He.

It 1. that whioh at aD7

glven moment ls oonsolous. whereas the!! 1. only one ot the
thlng. whloh It Is consolou.

!!."54

It thls

!. or thinker, 1.

only the .tream at thought. then how explaln it. unity?
1••o.ethlng deeper and le.s mutable, ju.t what 1. it?

It it

In his

analy.is ot the empirloal ......
He, Jame•• tated that "thought. whioh
we actually know to exi.t do not tly about loo.e, but •••• to
belong to some one thinker and not to another."S5
though. continuity 1n thi. thinker?
that I was yesterday"?

I. there,

Can he .ay, "I am the .ame

Th••mpirical .elt, granted, 1. ea-

sentlally the .ame in the .ense that it 1. continuous.

Thi.

attribute ot oontinuity give. to the .elt "the unlty ot .ere oonnectedn.ss or unbrok.nn•••• a perteotly definlte pheno.enal
thing • • • "56 Can the .ame be 8aid of the thinker?
.uoh a thing?

Or is there

To this last question James replle., "f,hat there

la .uch a prlnciple 1. the reigning doctr1ne ot both philo.ophy
and oommon ••n ••• and yet refleotion find. It dlfflcult to

54 William Jam•• , P.ychologz. Cleveland, 1948, 195.
55

Jame., Princlple.

!!

P81chololl, I, 330.

56 Jame., P'lchololl, 202.
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ju.tit, the idea."57

In this dilemma he turned to a simile tor

help in explaining his notion ot the "thinker."

Acoording to

this aimile, in which he use. the tigure ot a herd ot cattle,
"the beaat. were brought together into one herd because their
owner found on each ot them his brand.",8

The owner here stand.

tor that .ection ot consciousne.s whioh recognizes and pronounoes,
on the identity; the brand, tor those oharacteristics which are
limilar and which cause the consciousness to recognize the
thoughts as belonging to it.

The obvious diftioulty in thia ex-

planation is to explain the owner.

Oommon senae oall. tor a real

owner, a spiritual entity ot some kind.

It maintains that it i.

the real relation to this entity which make. the individual
thoughts atick together, and that without thia relation to .uch
a real entity "their actual acoretion into a 'personal consciou.ne •• ' would never have taken place. n59

Jaaes peroeived the dit-

ticulty ot having many thing. ru.e without a medium, but he .aid:

[;r:] n our own acoount the medIum is tully as.igned, the

herdsman is there, in the shape ot .omething not among
the things collected, but superior to them all, namely,
the real, present, onlooking, remembering, Judging
'thought' or identitying 'section' ot the stream. 50

57 Ibid., 202.
58

James, Princi21es

59

-Ibid.,
Ibid.,

60

-

337.
337.

~

PSlchologl, I, 337.

But common-sense atill is not satistied.

It claim.s that "unless

the Thought have a substant1al identity w1th a former owner--not
a mere cont1nu1ty or a semblance, as 1n our account,"6l the unitT
or 1dent1tT ot personal consc10usness 18 not explained.

Now

James sav that this claim led direotly to e1ther the "soul
theory" of metaphYSics, or the "transoendental Ego" ot Kant, and
he did not want to admit either ot these solut10ns.

ae theretore

propo.ed another explanat10n whereby the "t1tle" ot the collectIve selt 1. passed trom one thought to another 1n 80me analogous way.
It is a patent taot ot consciousness that a transmission like this actually oocurs. Each pulse ot cognitive
consciousness, eaoh thought, d1e. awaf and is replaced
br another., The other, 8lI.Ong the thing. 1t know., know.
1ta own predecessor, and tinding 1t 'warm,' in the waf
ve have de.oribed, greets 1t, sa7ingl tThou art mine,
and part ot the same selt with me. t Each later thought,
knowing and includIng thus the thoughts whioh went
betore, is the final receptaole--and approprlati~g them
is the tinal owner--ot all they oontain and own. 0 2
James teels that this explanation answers satistaotor1ly, without
reoourse to an Ego or to a soul, the problem ot personal ident1ty, and prov1des, moreover, the solution on the phenomenal
level.

Thus, instead ot an Eso or a soul,

W8

have a "section" ot

the stream ot oonsciousness stand1ng as representative ot the
ent1re past stream, to be enveloped, in turn, by a subsequent

-.

61 Ib1d., .338.

-

62 Ib1d. , .339.

!
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"section" of the

SIJIle

atream.

appropriates ita predecessors.

The only d.1fficulty whioh remains

to be anawered is Just how one aeotion of the stream o£ thought
James both expresses this diffi-

culty and answers it in the follOwing passaget
A thing cannot appropriate itself; it !! itself; and
still less can it disown itselt •. There must be an agent
ot the appropriating and disowning; but that agent ve
have already named. It is the Thought to whom the var1our 'constituents' are known. That Thought is a vehicle
ot choice as well as ot cogn1tion; and among the
choices it make a are theae appropriationa, or repudiations, ot lts 'own •• 63
li1s oonclusion ia, then, that "the paaaing thought aeeu to be
the thinker; and though there

mal be another non-phenomenal

thinker behind that, ao far we do not seem to need him to expre.s
the tacta. n64 This position having been formulated, James takes
up and denies in turn the nspiritualiat" theor7, which holds that
the soul is a substantial, immater1al agent of psychic activity;
the associationist theorY', which holda that the "soul" i. on17 a
.erie. of separate but related ideas} and the transcendentalist

-

theon of Kant, which holds that the loul 11 an unknown X, tunotioning above the pure Ego, but unknown b7 it.

Thus by a atrictly empirical approach, James has analyzed the proceS8 of thinking.

Hi8 positlon ma7 be stated

briefly as the following, The stream ot thought, a personal,

63

64

-Ib1d.,
-Ibid.,

340.

342.

)0

active •• eleotive process, whioh reduce. the "undistinguishable,
swarming oontinuum" to an orderly, intelligible world, flows on
without interruption in eaoh ot us.

The pas.ing thought is the

only thinker, appropriating to itself the thoughts which bave
gone betore, and being in turn appropriated by it. successor.
We have seen in this ohapter oertain manifestations ot
Jame.'s artistic temperament, as, for example, his imaginative
desoriptions of the "stream ot thought" and the "herd of oattle."
We have seen the obvious influenoe of Darwin in the entire
development of the "stream of thought" and in the analysis ot its
oharaoteristics.

The background influence of Descart.s shows

it.elf in Jam.s's treatment ot the "spiritualist" position ot the
soul.

ae considers it as it it were a separate and separable

entity, inaocessible to the empirical psychologist, and theretore
something to be discarded aa unneoessary for an explanation ot
the observable tacts.

James's empirioal analysis ot the phe-

nomenon ot thought, which resulted in the theory ot the "stream

ot thought," was, aooording to Townsend, his major contribution
to the field, tor "he correoted the atomism of assooiationist
psychology and discovered continuities in the mental lite which
BUme, with his more rigorous logic, had been unable to

observe."~

This theory ot the "stream of thought," however, was based on a

6S B. G. Townsend, Philosophioal Ideas in the United
State., }few York, 1934, 141.
- -
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dualiam of knower and thing known aa two separate and distinct
entities.

In the next chapter we ahall a •• the conflict which

aroae between this dualism of the PSlchologz and the moniaM of
Jameata philosophic inv.stigations.

OHAPTER III
THE CON]i'LIOT BETWEEN PSYOHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPH!'

As we saw in the preceding chapter, James protessed an
explicit dualism ot knower and thing known in hi. PSlchology, but
hi. allegiance was divided between this "provisional doctrine"l
and the philosophy which he held in reserve.

Aa Perrl sallt

While hil mind had become clear as to the interrelations
ot the partl ot the stream ot consciousness--thelr
transitional and tunctional oontinuitl--he was sreatlJ
troubled by the Question of the relation ot oonsciousness
to the external world which it purport. to know. In order
to get on with his PSlchology, therefore, he made up his
mind to shelve thil question bl assumina the position ot
dualism. l
Bowever, in spite of his intention to set this epiatemological
question aaide, it definitell intluenced his thinking, and "the
protession ot dualiam, combined with an inner tendencl to moniam,
led to contusion and ambiguity"3 in manl parts at the Paychologz.
Added difficulties aroae from Jam8s's prolonged battles with

II, 72.

1

Perry,

~

Thought

~

-

2 Ibid., 39.

-

.3 Ibid., 73.
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William James,
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ideali.m, both Serkeleyan and Kantian.

It 1. the opinion of

Perry that "on the first issue, concerning empirioal or
Berkeleyan ideallam, James waa long of a dlvided mind, and it was
only towards the end of hi. career that he could pronounoe unequivocally in favor of realism."4

Paradoxicallz enough, it waa

during the writing ot hi. PSlohololl' when he aeems mo.t clearly
to profe •• extra-mental reality, that Jame. was strongly influenced bl idealll.,s and later, during the development of hi.
philolophy ot Radical Empirloi.m, when hi. theory ot "pure experi
enee- oau.ed manl accuaationa ot ideall.m and even ot aolip.ism,
that Jame. became an outapoken advocate of realism. 6
Indicatlona of hia moni.tic tendencles appeared early
in the laycholo81' though they were not clarified or tully
developed until Jame. began to work out alstematically hi.
philo.ophic ideas later in his career.

Bis note. during the

earll period7 ahow that he was attracted by Spenoer's tormula,
accordlng to which biological and palchological

4 Ibid., I, 573.
-

.' .,,'

.; /;). r~J--<

5 Perry,!!!!. Tho':1:Et and Oharacter !!!. William Jameti, Briefer Version, 273.

6 James, Essays

~ Radical Empiricism, Bew York, 237.

7 Parrl, The Thought and Character of William Jam.s,
I, 580. Parry has done-a slgn~ iirvlce tor eviFy student or
Jame. by his editing and publishing ot James's private not •• in
hi. comprehensive two-volume work on Jam.a. The •• note. are verl
helpful in clarifying certaln obscurities in Jame.'. published
wo:rks.

in esaenoe" both being an ad.Ju.t.ent ot "Inner" to "outer" relatlons.

Atter explaining Spenoer'a text, Jame. aays.

!he a7Othetl0 construotion ot objeotivity and aubJeotivity may mean that even in the most rudimentary sensation there i. a dim duality, a duplex aspeot, what one
may oall an timmanent' slde (which oonstitute. the taot
that it is aotually a aenaation), and a transoendent
81de (which ia the reterenoe to aomething aa known
through aenaation). The senaation in this view becomes
the torm ot knowledge, the reterence becomes its matter
or oontent, and the torm and the matter are inaeparable.
Even the min1mwa ot teeling has them. • • • I 1I171elt
1ncline more and more to 80.e view as this • • .H
Though this obaervation was written at the time when Jamea was
working on the pSZ0holoil. It oonstltutes a ditterent approach
and theretore 18 not immediately evident in that work.

However,

it we take a pas8age trom the palcholoil and tollow Jamea'a line
of reaaoning olosely. we shall .ee ev1denoe ot the trend toward
monism.
In hi. dlsoussion ot the consoiousness ot .elt, James
says, "The tselt ot .elves,. when oaretully examined. Is tound to
conslat mainly ot the collection ot these peculiar motlons In the
head, or between the head and the throat."9 It a generalization
ot this personal observatlon can be made, then "It would tollow
that our entire teeling ot spiritual activity, or what commonly

-

8 Ibid., $'81.

9 Jame., Prinoiples ot Pszchologz. I, 3011 ct. Ea.ala

1n Radical Empiricism. 31. tor &-later and more complete analysIa
thIa n.elr 01 selvea."

or
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pas.e. bl that name, is realll a teeling ot bodill activities
whose exact nature is bl most men overlooked."10

The oonclusion

to be drawn trom this hypothes1s 1s that "the existence ot this
thinker would be given to us rather as a logical postulate than
as that direct inner peroeption ot spiritual act1v1tl which we
naturalll believe ourselves to have."ll

After comparing the

po.tulated thinker behind .pir1tual activity to postulated matter
behind phlsical activitl, Jame. continues, "Between the postulated matter and the postulated thinker, the sheet ot phenomena
would then swing, some ot them (the frealities') pertain1ng more
to matter, others (the fictions, opinions, and errors) pertaining
more to the thinker. n12

Here we see the beginning of the theorl

ot "pure experience," the neutral monism ot Jamesta later philoaophl.

This "pure experience" was later described as neither

phYSical nor mental, but ju.t "that."

It remained tor the

knower to make the distinction, to lead awal trom the "pure experience" e1ther in the direction of the knower, or in the direction ot the realitl known.

Perrl observes,

When James spoke ot having a moni.tic philosophl in

10

James, principle.

11

-

12

Ibid.,

304.

-Ibid.,

304.

2! PSlchologz,

I, )02.

)6

.

re.erve 1) he m.ant to reter to the phenomenall.. Juat
.et torth, or to so.e further development ot It. Such
a development waa clearly Indicated, the phenomenon or
frepre.entation' ot Benouvier oon.trued a. both .ubject and object, was to become the ph.nomenon ot 'pure
experl.nce' con.trued as n.lther.14
Further Indications ot the monis. ot "pure .xperience" are round
el ••where In the P.ychololl.

In on. place Jame ••&YI, "Experi-

enc., trom the very atart, pre.entl

UI

with concreted object.,

vaguely continuou. wIth the relt ot the world Which .nvelops thea
in spac. and time, and potentIally divisible into inward ele.enta
and parts."l,

Again, in dl.cus.lns perception, Jam••• aY8. "OUr

earlie.t thought. are almost exclusively ••nsational.

with thelr relation. not brought out."16

T.bey

m.rely give us a .et ot that., or Itl, ot subjects or disoourse,
In still another place,

the analy.i. ot an entirely new ••nl.tion lugge.tl • latent tendenoy to monis.:
I. it a .ubjeotive quality ot t.ellng, or an obJeotive
quality telt? You do not even alk the que.tion at thil
point. It il limply that taate. But it • dootor hearl
you d•• cribe It, and ••y'l i l i l now you know what heartburn ii,' then it becom•• a qualIty already exIstent
extra _m....n_t....m
..... ~ which you in turn have come upon and

13 IbId. , 220.
I, 584.

14

-Perry,

15

Jame., prlnoi21e•

~

Thought

16 Ibid. , II, 3.

-
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Character

~

William James,

!! psychology, I, 487.
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learned. The rirat apacea, time., things, qualities,
experienced by the child probably appear, 11ke the
first heartburn, in this absolute way, a •• imple beings,
neither in nor out of thought. l 7
These sections of the PSlcholoSI seem to indicate the beginning
of the later theory of "pure experience" with its neutral entities, inditrerent to the distinction between subJeotive and objective.

James, however, had not elaborated this theory at the

time of the writing ot the Psychology, and conaequentlz "he did
not yet teel that it afrorded a seoure toundation tor his psyobological superstructure. n18
The first positive step at this time toward a monistic
philo.Ophl, and one whioh waa entirely in harmony with the oontent and method or approach 1n the Psycholoil, was the rejection
ot the soul.
It ia at all eventa needless tor expressing the aotual
.ubjective phenomena ot oonaoiou.ne •• as they appear.
w. have formulated the. all without its aid, by the
supposition at a stream or thought., eaoh substantially
difterent tram the rest, but cognitive at the rest and
'appropriative' of eaoh other's content •• 19
Baving thus disposed ot the first elemer-t ot Descartes' !!! cogitans,
...........

James began to undermine the second element, namely, con-

sciousnes..

In his aooount ot the nature ot "selt" and our oon-

11 ..........
Ibid., I, 272 •

II, 73.
19

James, Prinoiple.

2!

psychology, I,

344.
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sciousnes. of "selt," he describea the emplrical "me," all that
la lett ot the "subject" In hia prote.sedly duallstlc p.ycholoiY,
in objeotive terms, "The worda •• , then, and

!!!!,

so tar aa the7

arou.e t.ellng and oonnote emotlonal worth, are objeotive deslgnationa, meaning all the thing. whioh have the power to produoe
In a .tream ot oonsolou.ne •• exoitement ot a oertain peouliar
.ort."20 The tollowing analy.18 ot personal IdentIt,. .ubstantiate. thia diminution ot the "subject":
The aense ot our own personal Identity, then, ls exaotly
llke anyone ot our other peroeptlons ot sameneas amoni
pheno.ena. It 18 a oonolusion grounded elther on the
rese.blano. In a tundaaental respeot, or on the oontinulty betore the mind, ot the phenomena oompared. 21
It was not, however, untl1

man,. ,.ears

later that James telt .ut-

tioiently sure ot hia theory to make expllo1t and outrlght his
reJeotion ot "con.ciouana.a":
lOr twent,. years paat I have mistrusted I conaoiou.ness ,
as an entlty; tor aeven or elght years past 1 have suggested It. non-exi.tanoe to my stUdent., and tried to
give them its pragmatl0 equlvalent in realities of experience. It .ee" to me that the hour is rlpa tor It
to be openly and unlveraall,. dlacardad. 22
This rejectlon ot "conac10uanea." might .eem absurd at tirst
glance, tor no one oan den7 that thoughts exiat.

-

Jame. claritie.

20; Ibid., .319.

21

22

Ibid.,
-Jame.,

)41.
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hia atatement by aaying, "I ••an only to deny that the word
stands tor an ontity, but to inai8t m08t emphatioally that it
doea atand tor a tunotion."23

!hat tunction ia knowing.

It i8

to explain thi. tunction that we have been acouatomed to use the
ter.m "conaciousness," that element ot the !!! cogitana which pertorma the function ot knowing.

Row what we call "consciouane8s"

i8 not 8ueh an entity. but la a oapacity or quality which parts

ot experienoe have ot being known.

fhe attributes ot subject and

object, ot thought and thing, are .erely practical distinction8
arising trom their fUnction, not trom their being.~
!here i8 • • • no aboriginal stuft or quality ot being,
contrasted with that ot which material object8 are made,
out ot which our thought8 ot them are made; but there
1a a tunction 1n experience which thoughta perform, and
tor the pertormance ot which thi8 q~a11ty ot being i.
invoked. That function i8 knowing.25
Row that Jamea haa rejected the traditional explanation ot the
process of knowing, he teela hi. . elf obliged to provide in 80me
way tor that tunction'8 being carried on.

It i8 tor thi8 rea80n

that he prop088. hi. moniam ot "pure experience":

H1 the.is i. that it we start with the aupposition that
there 1. only one primal stutf or material in the world,
a .tutt of whioh everything ia compo.ed, and it we call

-Ibid.,

23 Ibid., 3.

24
25

-Ibid., 4..232.
-
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that stuff 'pure experIence,' then knowIng oan easily
be explained as a particular .ort ot relation toward.
one another Into which portions at pure experience may
enter. The relation it.elf II a part ot pure experienoe;
one at It•• terma' become. the .ubJect or bearer ot the
knowledge, the knower; the other beco.e. the objeot
known. 26
Bence experience in the instant field of the present i8 only potentIally either subjective or objective.

Obviously these are

but functional attributes, and are numerically the same In the
state at pure exporience. 27
It 1. by ••ans of this hypothesis that James intend. to
.olve the fundamental problem ot epistemology: how is It possIble
tor one thing to be in two place. simultaneously?

All prevIous

atte.pta at aolving thla problem had been based on a dualism at
knower and thing known aa the minimum possible In any act ot
nitlon.

008-

On the contrary, Jame• •aya, "Experience • • • haa no

such inner duplicity. and the .eparation at it into consciousne.s
and content come., not by way ot lubtraotion, but b7 way ot adIn order to bring out his point more olearly, he u.e~

dltion."28

a mathematical anal0871
The puzzle ot how the one identical room can be In two
place. i8 at bottom just the puzzle ot how one identical
point can be on two line •• It oan, it it be situated at

26 ...........
IbId., 4 •

27 ............
IbId., 23 •
28

IbId.,
...........

9•

their inter.ection; and .iDdlarly, it the 'pure experience' ot the room were ot a place ot inter.ection ot
two processe., which connected It with ditterent groups
ot associates respectively, it could be counted twice
over, a. belonging to either group, and spoken ot loo.ely as existing in two places, although it would remain
all the time a numerically sIngle th1ng. 29
In spite ot the explanation provided by this analogy, the que.tion remains: Just what Is thi. "pure experience."

lam•• says,

"The instant tleld of the pre.ent ls at all times what I call the
'pure' experience.~30

And again, "[I]t il plain, unqualified

actuality, or existence, a slmple ...........
that.")l Such a de.cription,
however, hardly satisfle. the mind, and so lame. attempts to be
more specltic:
r~here is no general sturt ot which experience at
large is made. !here are as many stutts a. there are
'natures' in the things experienced • • • • Experience
is only a collective name tor all these sensible
naturel, and lave tor time and Ipace (and, it you like,
tor 'being') there appears no univerlal element ot
which all things are made.)2

.eedless to say, this explanation led to a great deal ot mi.underltanding, partly because ot the ditficulty inherent in such a
novel concept, and partly because James never adequately distinguished between this "pure" experience and subjeotive or con-

~

Ibid., 4.
...........

)0

IbId.,
...........

23.

Ibid., 23.
31 ...........
Ibld., 26.
32 ............

Bcioua experience.

Oonsequently, many who followed the deyelop-

ment of this theory aooused James of monistic idealis., and 80me
even of solipsism.33

Oharles Sanders Peiroe, an associate of

James at Barvard, and a reputable philosopher in h1s own r1ght,
expressed his opinion of the theory thus:
What you oall 'pure experienoe' 18 not experienoe at all,
and oertainly ought to have a name • • • • It is vital
tor aoience that he who introduoes a new oonoeption
ahould be held to have a duty imposed upon him to invent
a sutfioiently diaagreeable aeriea of words to express
It.34
James, however, merely reiterated his explanation, and oont1nued
to hold fast to the theorr.
the troublesome

It was for him the only solution to

ep1~t.mological

problem because in his theorr

alone he saw a plausible explanation of the funotion of knowing.
As he says:
The tirst great pitfall from which such a radioal atanding by experienoe will save us is an art1ficial conception of the relations b.tween knower and known. Throughout the hi.tory
philosophy tSe subject and its object
have been treated aa absolutely discontinuous entitie.;
and thereupon the presence ot the latter to the former,
or the 'apprehenSion' by the tormer of the latter, haa
asaumed a paradoxical charaoter which all sorts ot
theories had to be invented to overcome.3$

or

Jame. telt that hi. theory, tounded a. it was on the empirical
data of hi8 atudie. in paychology, provided at least aa good an

33
II, 388.

34

Ibid. , 234.
-Perry,
!!!! Thought and Charaoter of William James,
-

35 Jame., Ea.a a in Radioal

irioism"

52.
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explanation for the funotion ot knowing as had been provided by
any ot the theories in the past, even though "pure experienoe"
was admittedly rather elusive under close analysi., and oontained
diffioulties which kept 1ta author occupied with lengthy explanation ••
The f1rst diff1culty crew out ot the very not10n of
"pure experienoe."

We have

~een

how Jaae. handled thiS, and also

the weakne.s.s whioh he attempted In valn to explaln away.

In a

later e.say.36 he made another attempt to explain in detall the
nature of "pure experience."

It was here that he admitted that

"only new-born babe., or men In .emi-coma trom sleep, drug., 111nesse., or blows, may be as.umed to have an experlenoe pure in

Since this explanation oarries the theory into the broader oontext
the literal sense of a that whioh is not yet any definite what."JI'

of Radioal Emp1rici.M, it will be taken up in relation to the
whole philosophio structure in the next ohapter.
Another objection leveled was against the tenet of
"pure experienoe" that thought and thing are numerically the same,
that subJeotivity and objeotivity are only functional attribute.,
realized only when the experienoe i8 "taken," i.e., "considered
along with its two differing contexts respeotlvely, by a new

.36
.37

-Ibld.,
Ibld.,

-

92, "The Thing and Its Relatlons."

94 •

44
retro.pective experience, ot which that whole past complication
now forma the fresh content."l8

It thls is

'0,

the obJectlon

runl, "how come. it that it. attrIbute ••hould dIffer
mentally In the two takIngs'

.0 funda-

A. thing, the experience 1s ex-

tended. as thought, it occupies no space or place."39

Jame.

begin. hi. retutation of this objection by the question, "Are
thought and thing as heterogeneous as is commonly laid,"40

Then

he describe. the ele.ents whioh they have In common, such .a
time, parts, .impliclty, or oomplexlty.

Both can be d.scribed.

Both are extended, though mental extension is relatlve to the
context.41 ae substantiate. thil by reterence to the psycho10glcal data on peroeption, and .ays that "psychology books are
full ot faota that make for the easentlal homogeneity of thought
wi th thing. "42 !he only sure wa., whioh we have of distingui.hing
the two are b., their oon.equence'l real objeot. alwaYI have oonlequenc.s, whereal mental objects do not.43

Ibid. ,
-Ibid.
-Ibid. ,,

27.
27.

41

28.
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One tinal objection which warrant. .eriou. oonsideration i. that ot two or IIlore mind. knowing one thing.

Bow can a

unit ot "pure experienc." ent.r into and tigure in two div.r••
• tr.ams ot consciou.n••• without turning it.elt into the two
unit. ot a duali.tic P'7chologJ'

Atter examining the que.tion

caretul17. Jame ••ar"
There is a wa7J and the tir.t .t.p towards 1t i. to s.e
mol'. preoi ••17 how the unit enter. Into elther one ot
the .tre... ot con.clousne •• alone. Ju.t what. troa _1.1.
belng 'pure.' doe. ita b.coming 'consclou.' once ..an~

-

In order to bring out hi. solution mol'. clearlr, James take. the
example ot a pen.

The pen In itaelt 1. "pure experience," and

tigure. in a "con.ciou." lite onl7 Insotar a. it haa been appropriated.
That pen, virtually both objeotlv. and SUbJective. 1.
at it. own mo.ent actuallr and Intrin.ecallr nelther.
It hal to be looked back upon and u.ed in order to be
cla.sed in .ither distinctlv. war.~ it. u.e, so
called. is in the hands ot the other experlence, while
!! .tand8'4ihrOUghout the operatIon, paaslve and
unchanged. 5
low it the pen reaaina unchanged when appropriat.d br one stre..
ot oon.ciou.n•••• no n.w condItion would have to b• •uppli.d when
it was appropriated br two or aore .tr.aml ot con.clouln••••
Th. two actl would int.rt.re n.lther with on. another
nor wlth the originallr pur. p.n. It would .1.ep undllturbed in 1 t. own pa.t, no matter how man7 .uch IUCce ••or. w.nt through their leveral appropriative aot8.

-

44 !2!!., 128.
45 Ibid., 130.

-
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Bach would know it al '.y' p.rcept, .ach would olass it
as a 'conacioua' fact.46
Bence Jamel concludel bl way of anlw.r to the difficulty:
The paradox of the aam. .xp.rienc. figuring in two oonIciouln.s ••• I ••ml thus no paradox at all. To b. 'oonIciouI' meanl not simply to be, but to be report.d,
known, to have awarenell of one'l being added to that
b.ing; and thil il just what happens when the appropriative exp.ri.noe supervenes. Th. pen-.xperienoe in its
original imm.diacy il not aware of it ••lf, it simply iI,
and the a.cona experi.nc8418 required for what we oalrawareness of it to occur. 7
In concluaion, then, we have a.en 1n th1a ohapter the
reourr.noe ot Jamea'a r.pr •••• d philosophio ideas in the text ot
h11 P'lchology, and the d.velopment of the p.ychological theorle.
awal trom the traditional dualllm of mind-matter to a moni.tic
theory of pure experienoe.

"Pure experienoe," as oonlldered in

this ohapter, was the outgrowth ot a subconscioul application of
the prinoiples of Radical Empirioi8m to the field of PSlchology,
lubconsciou., it •• em8, becau•• Jam •• had expressly set aside hil
philolophic .peoulationl in order to complete his P'lchologz.
'everih.l•• s, hil .limination of the soul and hia diminution ot
the "aelt" in thia work definitell paved the val for the e.tabli.hm.nt of the th.orl of pur. experi.noe.
the

a~.

tim. J ....

t.

~s

th.orl wa. at

lolution to the epiltemological problem and

a fundamental principl. in his philolophy of Radical Empiricilm.

46 Ibid.,
47 Ibid.,

-

131.
132.

CHAPTER IV
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RADICAL EMPIRICISM
Toward the end ot hi. lite, Jame. saw the need tor aome
systematic exposition ot hia tinal philo.ophic po.ition.

Be

besan to oollect articlea whioh had been published .arlier and to
group th.m under the title "Essays in Radical Empirioi ••,"l but
he died betore thi. proJect was completely carried out.

It va.

lett to Ralph Barton Perry to bring together in one volume a
•• riea ot .asay. which treat at Jame.ts tinal position.
When ve .peak ot the "philo.ophy" ot William James, we
do not reter to a clo.ed .y.tem at ldeaa, deduced trom one or
more tundamental princlple. and atandins as one integrated vhole.
As Perry vell .ay.z "The philo.ophy at William J .... cannot be
torced within the bounds ot any orderly syate..

Be had no lnt.r-

eat in intell.ctual architeotur., he was an .xplor.r, and not a
.urveyor or map mak.r."2

Radical Empiric1sm, theretore, should

1 J .... , Easaya in Radical Empirioia., pr.fao. by
Ralph Barton Perry, 111.
--

I,

449.

2 Perry,

l2! Thoulht !!! Oharaoter
47

~ William Jam.a,

48
~e

called a philolophic attitude or approach rather than a ololed

'Yltem or derinite doctrine, and it 1a characteristic ot allot
Jamel'a writingl, though it waa enunciated aa luoh only toward
the close ot his career.
A.lthough trace.

or

Radical Emp1ricism are, as we have

leen, tound in the PllChololl, the tirst explioit mention ot thl.

-

-

approach is tound in !he Will to Believe,
............,;..--' where lame. aay.,
It hal .eemed to me that these addresses might now be
worthy ot collection in a volume, as they Ihed explanatory light upon eaoh other, and taken together express
a tolerably detinite philosophio attitude in a very untechnical way_
Were I obliged to give a abort name to the attitude
in question, I Ihould call it that ot radical kriliriCil., 1n Ipite ot the tact that such brier nro
el are
nowhere more misleading than in philosophy_ I say 'e.piricis.,' becau.e it i8 oontented to regard itl most
assured conolulionl ooncerning matter. ot tact .s hypothe.e. liable to moditioation in the oourse ot tuture
experienoe, and I .ay 'radical,' becau.e it treat. the
doctrine ot ~ni.m ltlelt as an hypothesis, and, unlike
80 muoh ot the halfway empiricism that 11 current under
the name ot positivilm or agno.tici.m or scientitic
naturalism, it doe. not dogmatically atfirm monism as
something with which all experience has got to square.)
A tew years later, in a letter to the Italian translator ot hil
Psychology, James mentioned thil "philosophic attitud." al hil
predOminant intere.t.
I am interested in a
piricilm') which has
intere.ted, in taot,
els., but 1t ls very

metaphysical IYlte. ('Radical Eabeen torming itselt within me, more
than I have ever been in anything
ditticult to get it into Ihape tor

3 Jamel, The Will to Believe, Xew York, 1931, pretace,
vii; tirst edition pUDIiiEi! In 1891.

49
any conneoted exposition; and, though it contalns v.ry
practical elements, I tind It almost imp08sible to put
it into popular torm.4
At the time ot the writing ot this letter, F.bruary, 1905, Jam••
had alr.ady publi.hed two ot the mo.t important article. on hi.
"metaphy.ical sy.tem," namely, "Doe. Con.ciou.ne.s Exi.t?"S and
"A World ot Pure Experlence. n6

In the latter h•• tatea,

I give the name ot 'radical empirioism' to my W.lten8chauunf. Empiricis. i. known as the oppo.ite or
ratlona i.m. Rationali.m tend. to empha.ize univer.als
and to make whole. prior to parts in the order ot
logic a. well aa in that o~ being. Empirioi.m, on the
contrary, lay. the explanatory .treas upon the part,
the element, the individual, and treat. the whole a. a
coll.ction and the univer.al a. an abstraotion.7

II, 381.
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~
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5 Journal ot PhilO.O~, pszcholoil and Soientitio
M.thod., I" S.ptem.b.r", 19b4, o. 18.
6 Ibid., September 29, 1904,
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E.sa,s 1n Radical Em.,irici.m, 41, Perry give.
a good analy.1. ot empir ciii In £he tol owIng, "Empiricism i.
tundamentally the doctrine according to which the truth ot knowledge d.pends 1n the laat analy.i. on the cont1ng.nt exi.tenc. ot
that which 1. claim.d to be known. On. may think ever ao clearly
and ever so nec.s.arily--that in it •• lt prove. nothing. There
remalns the crucial .videnc., which i. the teatimony ot eye-witn••••• who are th.m.elve. in po ••••• lon ot the ultimate .vid.nce,
which i. the t •• timony ot the 'tact.' thems.lv.a. Thu., tor
.xampl., I judge that crow. are blaok. According to the e.pirical
th.ory, It suttice., in ord.r tbat this judgm.nt .hall b. correct,
that a black crow shall pre.ent it.elt. Whether the blackn••• ot
crow. i. 10glcally nec •• sary • • • is ot .econdary Importance:
according to empirici.m, the appearance ot one or more black
crows cuts .hort the argument and definitely s.ttl•• the matter."
Perry, !2! Thousht ~ Character 2! William Jame., I, 452.

so
In this artiole James explains more fully what he means by the
qualitying adjective "radical."

The older British empirioists--

Looke, Serkeley, and HUme--had tr1ed to analyze knowledge in
terms ot simple sensations and then to reoonstruot it out ot
the.e components.

By thu •• tressing the disjunotive aspect of

experienoe aad neglecting the conjunctive, they were torced to
supply some artitioial conneotive to explain the relations
The.e "oonneotives n were later

between any two sensations.

attacked by the 1dea11st critics ot empiricis., and it was preci.ely because ot their evident weaknes. that the idealists, or
rationalilts as Jamel otten called them, resorted to such transempirical agentl as substances, soul., and intellectual catagorie •• 8

Bow James maintained that it the.e empiricists had

taken everlthins in experienoe, conjunctions as well as disjunction., there would have been no need for such artificial connectives.9

Theretore he laid great stre •• on the pre.enoe ot rela-

tion. in experience, and on the baais of the.e relations, a. we
shall see later in an anallsis of the basic tenets ot Radical Empiricis., he developed his own version ot e.pirici •••
8 James, E.sala in Radical ~iricism, 43. on this
pOint, ct. the introduoiory-..sal to W Ia. James by Paul Henle
ot the University ot Mlchigan, in Classic American Philosophers,
Max B. Pisch, Ed., New York, 19$1, 121.

9 James, Essals

~

Radical !!piricis.,

44.

With this general description ot the t.n.ts ot Radioal
Empirioi.m betore us. it will be helpful at thi. point to di.tinsai.h betw.en Jame.'s position and other expr.ssions ot th1s
"sy.tematie way ot handling que.tiona" which developed .imultaneou.ly and were ott.n contu.ed with it.

Jame. him.elt. at l.a.t

in hi. early p.riod ot philo.ophic writ1ng,10 pret.rred to con.ider the positions ot Deweyll and Schillerl2 to be ditterent
trom hi. own mer.ly in approach or in emphasis.

A. Perrl .ays:

In the Pr.tace to Th. Meaning ot Truth Jame. undertook
to r.pre.ent the vIew. ot Diw.Y; schIller, and hims.lt
a. compl.m.ntarl rather than contlicting. Schiller'.
univer.e waa 'p.ychological,t his own 'epi.temological,'
and a8 tor D.w.l'.--it va. the 'wide.t ot the three,'
but he retrained trom giving hi. own account ot it.
complexity.l3

10 P.rry, The ThOUet and Character ot William Jame.,
II, 531; ct. Jame.'. pretace 0 The Meaning ot ~£h.
11 Perry. Th. Thought and Character at William James,
II, 514; Perrl otter.-rn this .ectIOn an Intereiting oompari.on
between Jame. and Dew.rl "Dewey'S pragmati.m or 'in.trum.ntallsm'
i. more single-minded than that ot James. He is primarily conc.rned with the analrsi. ot the cognitive prooe.s. U. i. not
.ati.tied with g.neral .tatement. ot it•••••ntially practical
character, but undertake. a meticulous examination ot it•• tructure."
12 Ibid., II, 494; ct. Perrr, PhilO.Ohby at the Reoent
past, 195: "In England the leading .xponent
t i .ohool I.
~. s. Schiller. U. calls thl. phllo.oph7 'humani.m,' in order
to empha.iz. the dependence at knowledge and truth on human
nature and on the moral and religious demand•• "

or

13 Perry, The Thou~t and Character ot William Jame.,
II, 531; Perry .ay. here lhit am;a-wa. InclInea-to term Dewey'.
approaoh "ontological" but retrain.d b.cau.e ot Dewey'. objection
to thi. term.

S2
Jame. was inclined to minimize the ditterences since his writings
contained a wide variety ot ideaa which were not logically connected with the matter under discusaion, whereas Devey recognized
the ditterencea aa more tundamental.14
Another term whioh haa trequently been uaed in relation
to Radical EmpiriCism is pragmatiam.

In his pretace to the work

Pragmatism, James distinguished between the two when he .aid:
"!here i. no logical conneotion between pragmatism, a. I under.tand it, and a doctrine which I have recently .et torth as
'radioal empiricism. t

The latter stand. on it. own teet.

may entirely rejeot it and still be a pragmatist.nlS

One

He telt,

however, that "the establishment ot the pragmatist theory ot
truth is a atep ot tirst-rate importance in making radical empiri
cism prevail. n16 From this it aeem. that James looked upon pragmati.m aa an adjunct to the more complete philosophic approaeh
ot Radical Empiricism.

Thia opinion is

conti~ed

by his comment

in another place: "It aeems to me that it radioal empiriCism is
good tor anything, it ought, with its pragmatic method and ita
prinCiple ot pure experience, to be able to avoid such tangle.,

14 ............
Ibid.,
15 Jame.,

II,

16

~

James,

514 •

Prai!!ti.m, .ev York, 1912, pretaoe, ix.
Meaning

2!

Truth, pretaee, xll.
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or at l.ast to simplity them so.ewhat."17
Turning now trom our general study ot Radical Empiriclsm and its relation to the doctrines ot Dewey and Schiller to •
more detailed study ot ita basio teneta, we tind the only .xplicit atatement by James in the pretac. to

~

M••ning

!!

Truth.

Radlcal Empirioism con.i.t. tirat ot a postulat •• "That the only
things that shall be d.batabl. among philo.ophers shall b. things
d.tinable ln t.rm. drawn trom .xperl.nc •• "lB

Jam•• admits that

there ma1 be things ot an unexp.rl.nceabl. nature. but th•• e
should torm no part ot the material tor philosophio debate.

The

application ot this postulate is evldent in hls treatment of the
loul In the 'szchololl, where he laYI, "Th. Soul-th.ory ii, then,
a compl.t••up.rflulty,

.0 tar aa accounting tor the actually

17 J ..... E•• ay. in Radloal ~iricism, 159. Jame. her •
• xplain. what he mean. by pragmati.m: "~ pragmatlc method .tart.
trom the po.tulate tbat there i. no ditterenc. ot truth that
doesn't make a dltterence ot tact somewhere, and it seeks to
determine the meaning ot all ditterencel ot opinion by making the
dilculsion hinge as soon as possible upon some practical or
particular i.sue." Pragmatism, tak.n in this .en•• , 1. clo.ely
al11ad to Radical Emplriois•• Bene. Paul S.nle .ay. in hil introduction to William Jame.: "In hls thought, unqueltionably, radical empiricis. i. an outgrowth ot the pragmatic method • • • • "
Cla.sic Am.rican Philoloph.r., Max B_ Fisch, ed., 121.
18 Ja.•• , Th. H.anini ot Truth, pr.tace, Xii, thi.
atat••ent ot Jame. i.-quot.a by '.rry in his introduction to
Essals in Radioal EmflriOis. which h• • dited atter Jame.'s death.
!h. postUlate Is obv ously airected agatnat those whom James
termed "rationalists," and is meant to insure the fundamentally
empirlcal character ot his philosophy_

verified taotl ot conicioul experience goe •• "19

It i. to be

noted that he doe. not claim to have e.tablished the non-existence ot the .oul,20 but only to have .hown that, tor scientific
purpo.e., it il not neceslary to explain the tactl ot experience.
For J ..el, theretore, lt is no longer matter tor philosophic dllcUllion.

It may eXist, or it mar not, but sinoe it cannot be

defined' In term. drawn trom expertence it will not be conlidered.
ae clartties this point later vhen he saYI:
TO be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into itl
constructionl any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude trom them any element that i_ directly experienced. 2l
When attacked on this point by Mr. Pitkin, an "absolutist" critic,
James identities thil statement ot hi& as a "methodological postulate, not a conclusion Iupposed to flow trom the intrinlic ablurdity ot transempirical objecta."22

19 J .... , Principle. !! Psychologz, I 348.
20

21

Ibid., I, 350.
-James,
ESla11

~

Radical Emeiricilm, 42.

22 Ibid., 241: argument again.t an article by W. B.
Pi tkin, ·'A Pro'6Iiii ot Evidence in Radical Empirioism, tf published
in the Journal ot Philosophl, PIICholO gy and Scientitlc Methods,
III, lfoveiiiber 2r, 1906, NO.~. I ~ohn.iaer comments on thrl
pOint: "To clear the decks of non-empirical, tmetaphysical' problem., he devised pragmatism, it vas intended to facilitate and
clarify 'philosophical dilcuslion.' Unfortunatel" it dld the opposite; it became one more bone of contentton and one more scheme
tor 'jultlt,ing' unverIfIable taithl." A Bl.tori ot American
Philo.oehZ, by aerbert W. Schneider, .ew YorK, 940, S,O.

Radical Empiricism conaiats, secondly, ot a statement
ot tact: "That the relations between thinga, oonjunotive as well

as disjunctive, are just .s muoh matters ot direct particular experienoe .s the things themselves."23

It is in this statement

that James departs radioally trom traditional empiricism, tor her
he as.erts that the relations between things, as well as the
thing. themselve., are immediately perceptible in experience.
ThIs assertion Is a development ot the opinion tirst expressed in
the lszcholoSlJ "It there be such things as teeling8 at all, then
so surely as relationa between objects exist

~ re~

natura,

80

surely, and more aurely, do teelings exist to which theae relationa are known."24

He goes on to aay, aa we have already indi-

oated, that not only are there teelings ot oolor and ot ...........
cold, but
there are alao teelings ot

1£,

ot

!!!l,

ot!l.

Language has

recognized the former, but has oonaiatently refused to reoognize
the latter, and in this refusal lies the tendenoy to aocentuate
and isolate more and more the sUbstantive parts ot experience,
and thus bring about .erious ditfioultie. in relating the.e parts
which have been i.olated.

Jame•• ay.t

Di]hen a common man analyze. certa1n what. trom out the
.tream ot experience, he under.tand. their di.tlnotnes.
23

Jame.,

~ Meanl~

2! Truth, pretace, xii.

24 James, Prinolple. 2! Psychologl, I, 245.
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as thus ls01at.d, but this doe. not pr.vent him from
equiIIY well und.rstanding their oombination with .aoh
oth.r as originall, .xperienced in the conorete, or
their confluence Wt5 new senslbIi experi.nces in whioh
they recur as 'the same.' Returning into the .tream ot
sensible presentation, noun. and adj.ctiv.s, and that.
and ab.tract what., grow conflu.nt again, and the word
tis' name. all t5••••xp.ri.nc.s ot conjunotlon. 2S
Finally, the g.neraliz.d conolusion is expressed in the
tollowing mann.r: "The parts ot .xperienoe hold together trom
next to next by relations that are them.elve. part. ot .xperieno.
The dir.etly apprehend.d universe need., in short, no .xtraneous
trans·empirioal conneotive support, but po ••••••• in it. own
right a ooncatenated or oontinuou•• tructure."26 What Jam••
means here i. that there is no need tor supposing a aubstratum ot
matter, as Lock. did; nor a subltratum ot .pirit, as B.rk.l.y
did; nor a "consoiou.ne •• in g.n.ral" with Kant, nor an Abaolute
Mind with H.g.l and the ab.olut. idealists, nor an Unknowable
with Spenoer. 2 7 The only reality i. that which i. immediately

25 Jame., gs.als

!! Radical

!!pirielsm, 117.

26 Jame., The Hean1n8 of Truth, pretace, xli; ot.

E•• ail in Radical !ilIPrciam, I 7r-"Radleal empirici.m takes con-

juno lve-relatlons a £5elr taoe valu., holding them to b. aa
r.al as the term. united bl them. The world it r.pre.ents aa a
collection, some parts ot whioh are conjunotively and other. disJunctivell related • • • • Suoh determinately various hangingtogether mal be oall.d oonoat.nated union, to distingui.h it trom
the t thl"ough-and-through' iype ot unlon, 'each in all and all in
eaoh,' ••• which monistic 81.te.. hold to obtain when thing.
are taken in their ab.olute reality."

27 ot. W. K. Wright, B1.torl
.ew York, 1947, 526.
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experienoeable: ooncrete things and their relations.
In all this, the contlnuIti8S and the di.continuitles
are absolutel.,.. co-ordinate matters ot immediate feelillg.
The conjunction. are a. primordial elements ot 'tact'
a. are the distInctions and disjunotions. Prepositions,
copulas, and conjunotiona, '111,' 'isn't,' 'then,'
'betore,' 'ln,' 'on,' 'belide,' 'oetween,' 'next,'
'llke,' 'unlike,' lal,' 'but,' tlower out ot the Itream
of pure experlence, \he Itream ot conoretes or the len·
lational Itream, al naturall.,.. a8 noun8 and adjectives
do, and they melt into It again a8 fluldl1 when we
apply tham to a new portlon ot the Itre.m. 28
!he direct cor011ar1 ot the generalized conclulion 11 obvioull1 a
theory ot neutral monism.

What Jame. aotuall.,.. did was to expand

hil p.ychological theor1ot the ".tream of thought," i.e., ot
continuit1 in oonlciousnels, to a metaph11ioa1 theory of oontinuit7 In being, which he oalled "pure experienoe."

As Schneider

Sa71, "He conceived ot the common world in which we exilt a8 both
thlngs and thinkers a8 fa world ot pure experience,' a world ot
experience whioh 1., at the lame time, no one'l experience exolulive11."29

a-ving eliminated both the soul and con.ciousnesl

trom hil epiatemolol7, Jame. was torced to provide lome explanation tor the function ot knowing.

He tound hil explanation, and

at the lame time the lolutlon to the epi.temological problem, In
the tn.or7 of "pure experience."30

28 Jame., Esaa.,..,

~

Radical

29 Schneider,! B1ltorz

II, 388.

)0

Perr1,

~

Thougpt

~

~

Bm2irici.~,

95.

American Phil080phz, 544.
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Jame.'. difficultie., however, were by no means over.
He describes the.e in a .eriea of lectures which were later pub-

----

-

lished under the title A ..............................
Plurali.tic
Univer.e. !he crux ot the
,;;;;..;.. .;;.;..-.........
difficulties lay in what he perceived to be a conflict between a
tundamental point in his psychology and an equally tundamental
point in his philosophy.

In the ,sychololl he had rejeoted the

oompounding ot oonsciouanesa, and had maintained that "every
oomplex mental tact is a .eparate paychic entity, aucceeding upon
a lot ot other paychic entitie. whioh are erroneously oalled it.
parts, and superseding the. in funotion, but not literally being
oomposed ot them."31

In his later theory of "pure experience,"

he waa definitely comadtted to the view that reality and the
tield ot consoiouanes. were one and the .ame.

Thia implied, as

Perry observes, "that portlona ot the field could be common to
two or more minds) that the1 oould, In other word., be identical
parts ot ditterent oonsoiou. wholea."32

James kept a diary ot

his attempted solutions to thia proble. tor a period of over two
and a halt year., beginning in the autumn ot 1905.

aeterring to

thia account, he sald, "Sincerely, and patiently as I could, I
struggled with the proble. tor 1ears, covering hundreds ot sheeta

- ----------- _

31 James, A Pluraliatio Universe, 205.
........
........ ................
.32 'erry,!!!!. Thought ~ Oharacter !!. William Jame.,
Brieter Veraion, 331.

$9

of paper with notea and memoranda and disouasions with myself
over the difficulty."33
The fundamental diffioulty here was the taot that in
bia PSlchololl James had emphaai.ed the uniqueneas and indiviaibility ot the individual stream ot thought.

Bach passing

thought in the tlowing stream appropriated ita predecessors to
itself and was, in turn, appropriated by its successor.

It was

unique in the sen.e that the exact thought could never be repeated in any tuture context.

Perry makes the following observa-

tion on this point:
Jame. could then take this view without prejudioe to the
existence of a common and permanent world because ot his
distinction between thoughts and their object., the latter possesaing the commonness and permanence whioh the
tormer lacked. But now he had definitell renounced dualis., and in place ot thoughts and things there were only
'experiences.' It these poasesS&! the uniqueness and indivisibility ot thoughts, they mu.t lose the commonness
and permanenoe ot things! and there would remain only
the desperate alternative ot solipsism. It, on the other
hand, they possea.ed the commonneas and permanence ot
things, then they could never enter directly into a
uniquely individual oonscious experience. HoW to conceive experience so that it could retain both .eta ot
properties, composing both the immediate and the transient lite ot the aubject and the Stable world of common
objects·-that was James's problem.3~
In this predicament Jam.s realized that one of his positions had

33
II, 393.

Jamea,! .P_lu_r_a_l_i_s_t_i_o Universe, 207.

34 Perry,

~

Thought

~

Character
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to be abandoned.
I saw that I must either torswear that 'psychology without a soul' to which my whole psychological and kantian
education bad co~tted me, -- I MUst, in short, bring
back distinct spiritual agents to know the mental states,
now singly and now in combination, • • • or else I must
squarely oonress the solution ot the problem impossible,
and then either give up my intellectuallst 10glc, the
10glc ot identlty, and adopt some hlgher (or lower) tor.m
ot rationality, or, flgal17, face the tact that life is
10glcally irratlonal.35
Be decided definitely to eliminate the first possible solution,
the aoceptance ot a soul, because, "like the word 'oause,' the
word 'soul' is but a theoretic stop-gap

it marks a place and

olaims for it a tuture explanation."36

In the resulting dilemma:

on the one hand to give up the logic of identity, and on the
other hand to believe that human experience is fUndamentally irrational, James chose to give up the logic ot identity.

The

reason tor this decision was that "reality, lite, experience,
concreteness, immediacy, use what word you Will, exceeds our
logie, overflows and surrounds it."31

The predominant influence

in making this decision was, as he said, his reading ot Henri
Bergson.
It I had not read Bergson, I should probably still be
blackening endless pages ot paper privately, in the hope
of making ends meet that were never meant to meet, and
trying to disoover some mode ot conceiving the behavior

35

James, A Pluralistic Universe, 208.

36

Ibid.,
...........

210 •

37

Ibid.,
...........

212.
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of reality whioh ahould leave no diaorepanoy between it
and the aooepted lawa of the logic of identity.l~
After reading Bergaon, Jamea aaw clearly that he had fallen into
the dilemm. in whioh he found himaelf through the intellectualist
error of considering two abstractions apart from the conorete
reality in whioh they are found, and thus oonstruoting logioal
diffioulti.s and oppositions whioh are not found in the r.ality
concret.ly consider.d.

Therefore, Jame. saYI, "I have tinally

found myself oompelled to give

~

!2!

logio, fairly, squarely,

and irr.vooably,"39 tor "reality obeys a higher logio, or enjoYI
a higher rationality."40
Speoifically, Jamel's difficulty was
the impo ••ibility of understanding how 'your' experienoe
and 'mine,' whioh taB .uch' are defined a. not con.oiou.

38 Ibid., 2141 Berg.on's influenoe on James oonsisted
mainly in his .trong attaoks on "intelleotuali.m." Acoording to
James, intelleotualist abu.e. began wh.n "Soorat.s and Plato
taught that what a thing r.ally is, i8 told U8 by its definition." Ibid., 213. "So fir.t w. identify the things with the oonoept, and th.n w. Id.ntity the oonc.pt with a definition, and
only then, inasmuch a. the thing i. whatever the definition eXpre ••.•• , are we aure ot apprehendI'iig the real es.enoe of it, or
the full truth about it." Ibid., 218. " • • • it is at thi. point
that the mi.u.e ot oonoepta-srgins through the habit of employing
them, not to a •• ign properties to things, but to deny the very
properties with which the thing •••nsibly present themselve ••
When the logician oannot extract a oertain property trom a definition, he i8 t.mpted to deny that the conorete obJ.ct to whioh
the definition applies can possibly po •• ess that property." Ibid.,
219.
----.39
40

212.
-Ibid.,
Ibid., 213.

-
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ot each other, can neverthelels at the lame time be memberl ot a world-experience defined expreilly al having
all itl partl co-conicioul or known together.41

Enlightened by Berglontl analYlil, Jamel now law that the problem

ot how a thing can be its own

'other~

was merely the milule of

logic, and that, in reality taken concretely,
.enlational experiencel are their town otherlt • • • both
internally and externally. Inwardly they are one with
their partl, and outwardly they pass continuously into
their next neighborl, 10 that eventl leparated by yearl
of time in a manta life hang together unbrokenly by the
intermediary eventa. Their names, to be sure, cut th.m
into separate conceptual entities, but no cutl ~xisted
in the continuum in which they originally came.42
Thus the psychological-metaphYlical problem was settled.

There

still remained, however, the plychological-epistemological problem over the compounding of the states ot conscioulness.

This

was a ramification ot the tirst problem, but contained its own
particular difticulties, and its own distinct, though related,
solution.
From the notes resulting trom the Bode-Miller controversy we learn that James clearly recognized a contradiction between his psychology and his philosophy.
In mr psychology I contended that each field of consciousness il entltatively a unit, and that itl parts

41

Ibid.,
...........

221 •

42 Ibid., 285) cf. also 271: "This is Just what we
mean by the stream's lenlible continuity. No element there cuts
itself off from any other element, as concepts cut themselves off
trom concepts."
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are only difterent oognitive relations whioh it may possesa with ditterent oontexts. But in my dootrine43 that
the aame 'pen' may be known by two knowera I aeem to
imply that an identioal part can help to oonstitute two
fields. Bode and Miller both piok up the ooniradIotiion.
The tields are • • • deoomposable into 'parts,' one ot
whioh, at leaat, ia oommon to both; and my whole tirade
against toomposition' in the pSloholoSl is belied by my
own subaequent dootrine.44
The point at iaaue here is how two tielda oan be units it they
contain this oommon part.

Jamea puzzled over this problem tor

months betore he auddenly oase upon a po.aible aouroe.

He a.ked

himself, "Hay not my whole trouble be due to the taot that I am
atill treating what ia really a living and dynamIo aituation by
logical and atatioal oategoriea?"4S

At thia time he waa not yet

convinoed that h. was involved in such a oontradiction aa would
necessitate the changing ot either hia paychology or his philolophy, tor he lays,
The radioal empirioiat deal. with the question tot what
i. experienoe made?' while the p.ychological retleotor
deala with that ot 'how it oomes about.' The one takea
a statio, the other a dynamdo point ot view. They need
not, therefore, be exaotlr oongruent.46
Then he took up the "pen-problem" and the "F.chn.r-problem" to-

43
II, 1S0.

I •••• pur. experience.

-

-

44 Perry, The Thought and Character ot William Jamea.
4S
46

-

Ibid., 160.
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160.

-

64
gether, i.e., tIle question ot how the same percept may be an
aspect ot both physical and mental entities and also how the same
percept may be an element ot more than one consciousness.

To the

problem of how any term can singly and immediately be both

~

......

and ex another term, he answers that they may be
• • • by 'tunctioning' plurally. But functioning means
having relations; and to solve this problem the relations
must be external. Yet in the particular cases concerning
us, it would seem that they could hardly be external it
my chapters on mipd-stutt and on the stream ot consoiousness are correot.47
Having thus cast some doubt on hi. theories ot psychology, James
turned to his theory ot "pure experience" and the que.tion ot
how the same percept, the pen (in his example), may be an aspect

ot both physioal and mental entities.

Atter a careful analysis,

he says:
The difficulties oome only when for the seen pen 1s substituted the tixed logical term 'pen,' and when this 1s
treated as an absolute or indivisible unit that 'moveth
altogether it it move at a11 •• 48
The ditficulties, then, arise from the use at terms, auoh aa
"pen," abstraotly, apart trom their oontext in the stream at experience.
Theae terms cannot possibly have absolute logical values,
irrelevant to and contradictory ot the experienoes trom

47
48

~.,

760.
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which they are derived, and within whioh their oonsequences aotually evolve.49
Here again we see the intluence ot Bergson.

By now James began

to rea11ze that 1n this probl •• too he had rallen into "1ntelleotualis.," and so tells h1mselt: "Don't cleave to your phYSical
verbal sJmbol abatraotly and literally, but reinterpret it by
your immediate experiential taot."50

He-examining the double

aspeot at his problem in the light of this mandate, he saya:
The 'pen,' as a living real, is the name ot a buaine.s
oenter, a 'tirm.' It has many customers, my mind, e.g.,
and the physioal world. To oall it the same Een both
time. would mean that although my mind and t e physioal
world can and may eventually figure in one and the same
transaotion, they need not do so • • • and that in
reapeot ot this particular pen-experienoe neither
counts in the transaotlon which the other 18 carrylng
on. I.~ther ia counted by the other, neither i8 for the
other.51
TUrning then to the "Pechner-proble.," he aays:
Now take a .ental 'state' and trace the pos8ibility of
its being 'part' ot a wider mental state ot whioh it
knows nothing. The it here ie both co and ex the same
thing. Psychologioatry we know thatiiuch tErnss do
obtain • • • but ho'N' can they?S2
-

-

With this question in mind, James now looka tor other taots in
whioh the 8ame condition of non-reciprooity in relation ia found,

49

Ibid. , 761.

50 Ibid. , 761.
51 Ibid. , 764.
52 Ibid. , 764.
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and sa'1lt
Experience presents examples of it wherever there is
direction in the relation. Things are not mutuallihlater,
DIiher, ~etween, etc. aemembrance i8 not mutual.
'1
need 'consciou8ness' be mutual?S3
Here lie. the core ot the ditficult'1.

If consciousness i. not

-

-

mutual, there i. no problem about its being co and ex the same
thing.

James had ba.ed his assumption that consoiousne •• i.

mutual on the principle which he laid down in his PSlchology that
"mental facts are as they appear, and cantt 'appear' in two ways

-

to themselves."54

Since this principle i8 now found to be un-

verified by tact, J . .es i. forced to ohange the position tormerly

maintained.

He now statesl

DK]ental tacts oan (in spite of my Prinoi21es at PS'1chocompound i&imaelve., if 'TOU take them concretel'1
ana-livingl'1, a8 p08sessed ot various functions. They
can count variously, figure in difterent constellations,
without cealing to be 'themselves.,55
~)

In ooncluding this chapter, let us brierly recapitulate the development ot James's philosophy.

We have seen that

his Radical EmpiricIsm manifested a thoroughl7 empirical approach.
He took realit'1 to be just what it .eems to be from experience,
namel'1, "that di.tributed and strung-along and flowing sort ot

53

158.
II, 765.

54

55

-IbId.,
~.,

765.
765, cf. Jame., PrinCiples 2! Psychology, I,

Perr'1,

~

Thousgt

~

Character
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reality which we finite beings awim in. "56 Such a notion is obviously patterned atter his psyohological dootrine ot the "atream
ot thought" in ita characteriatica, and ita outatanding teature.
are thoae whioh ordinary logio reJecta.

Jamea tound himaelt in-

volved in logioal oontradictions whioh •• emed inaoluble until,
under the influence ot Bergson, he reoognized that they were the
result ot an "intellectualist" miluse of abstraoted ooncepta and
that the only solution was a return to the original concrete experiences trom which they had been taken.

On oloser examination

ot thea. tacta ot experienoe, Jamel tound that he had been

~s

taken in hia P8yohologz in the matter ot oompounding ot oonsCiousneas, and theretore he modified his psychological position
to contorm with the more recently disoovered facts.

-

Pluralistic .......
Univerae,
213.
56 Jamea, A ----..;;.;......;...;.--.......
~

;;.,.;..

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Any attempt to r.duce the writings ot William James to
a coherent and systematio philosophio structure i. fraught with
difficultie., tor he had no suoh structure.

'---

As Paul Henle sa1s:

It by a system of philosophy is m.ant fitting everything
in the universe into its proper logioally demaroat.d
compartment, James has no s1stem ot philosophy. In this
sens. h. hated system and his own piQture ot the world
leave. it full of loose ends and uncompl.t.d proc •••••• l

..

!

As we have .een, Jam.s was by nature, baokground, and .duoation
an .xplor.r, not a "map maker."

With his radioal empiriCist ap-

proaoh he appealed fir.t, last, and always to experienoe, that
oontinually changing flux which reveal. ever new a.pects and pos.ibilitie..

Jam.s him•• lt n.v.r oompl.ted, nor wish.d to oom-

plete, what could properly be oalled a system ot philosophy.

Bis

1d.as are .xpr.ssed for the most part in short articles or published series of l.ctur •• , and his m.dium was the popular style
-'''r·~--

of colloquial English.

Though h. was otten oriticized by the

more .cientitio minded of his coll.agues tor using suoh a styl.,
1 Cla•• ic Amerioan Philo.ophers, ed. by Max H. Fisch;
introduction £0 WIlliam James by 'aul aenxe, 124.
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.

he deemed it necesaary because he was writing largely tor listeners, not tor readers.

His tine sense ot judging the capacity ot

an audience resulted in his attaining "a vogue and intluence
almost unique among philosophical writers,"2 but it a180 resulted
in much obscuritr and contusion tor those serioue students ot
philosophy who were more interested in the thought than in
attractive expression.

James was aware ot this obsourity, and

otten expressed his intention ot writing a systematic metaphysics
in technical form tor his colleagues and tor advanoed students.
The following exoerpt from a letter dated August, 1902, atatea:
"I now want it posslble to write something serious, systematiO,
and syllogistio; Itve had enough ot the squashy popular-lecture
a t y 1 e • • • • "3

In spite of th1s d.sire, however, continual invi-

tations to lecture postponed the project, and though h. heartily
disliked lecturing, he usually aocepted the invitations.

As he

says in a letter to Schiller atter the request to deliver the
Bibbert Lectures at Oxford had reached him:
I accepted because I was ashamed to refuse a protessional
challenge ot that importance, but I would it hadn't come
to me. I actually hate lecturing; and this job condemns
me to publish anotner book written in picturesque and
popular style when I was settling down to something whose
manner would be more strengw1ssenschattlich, i.e., oonoise, dry, and impersonal.~ tree and easy style in

II,

364.

2

Perry,

-

~

Thought

3 Ibid., II, 338.
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Pragmatism has made me ao many enemiea in aoademio and
peaantlc circles that I hate to go on inoreasing thei,
number, and want to become tighter instead ot looser.4
The only articles whioh even approached the desoription ot "dry,
conoise, and impersonal" were those publiahed atter hi. death in
the volume Easays

~

Radical Empirioism.

In the opinion ot the

editor ot the work, these essays set torth "systematically and
within briet compass the doctrine ot 'radical empirioism'"S and
were designed "not as a collection but rather a. a treatise,"'
tor "not only were most ot them written consecutively within a
period ot two years, but they contain numeroua cross-reterenoes."7
Notwithstanding this oloae relationship, theae eaaay8 leave muoh
to be de.ired tor an all-inclusive atatement ot James's philoaophy.

So.e ot the essays, it is true, show a conseoutive

development ot thought, though othera are merely a restatement or
a clarittcation ot ideas already expressed.

!he essay. expreaa

the main tenets ot Radioal Empirioism, but they do not give the
full details ot this approach, nor do they link Radical Empiricism with Jamea's positions in psyohology, pragmati.m, or oos-

11'l010Q.8~-) It i. highly doubtful that Jame. would ever have tormu-j

-James,

4 Ibid. , II, S62.
S

Es.ala

~

Radical !meiricia., pretace, vi.

6 Ibid. , pretaoe, vi.
7

8

-Ibid. ,

pretaoe, Ix.
-A Pluraliatic
uniTerae develop. hi. c08molol7.
-
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lated a s7stem ot philosoph7 in the strict sens. of the word,
since both his nature and his approach to philosOph7 militated
againlt such a Itruoture.

His intention seem. to have been to

make at least a summar7 sketch ot his tinal positions and their
relations to one another.

ae

mi&ht have gone further and traced

the development of his thought over a period ot lome thirt7
7eara, showing clear17 his cona.cutive positions and their relation to the oonclusions in the various fielda whioh h. bad inv.atigated.

The faot remains, however, that Jaaes accomplished none

ot this, and the task is lett to his tollowers to formulat., to
the best ot their abilit7, some picture of his philosOph7 as a
whole.

Sinoe such a picture is essential tor a thorough under-

standins ot James, we will now give a brier sketoh ot the principal trends in his works trom the time ot the writing ot the
pSlcholoil until the publication ot ! Pluralistic Universe.
work Essays

~

The

Radical Em2iricisM, though published posthumousl7,

was written by James between the years 1884 and 1906.
The reduotion ot the consecutive positiona ot James to
an orderly presentation would be a challenge to the author himselt, so great is the diversit7 not only in the pOSitions themselves but also in the fields in which these poaitiona were
developed.

It we were to look tor a key, tor

~ne

word which

could be us.d to charac,terlze all of these positions, that word
l

'~,.

would be "experience."

James appealed throughout his life to
,

~

experience, d.spite the fact that tor many years he was a con-
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tl~ed

Ideallst, for his early training in the tradition ot Locke

Berkeley, and HUme drew him into the camp ot the Berkeleian
Ide&11ata.9

While atl11 profesalng this Idea1ism, he took the

posltion ot duali8m in his P1lchologz.lO

We have 8een, however,

that hi8 philo80phio bent, both before and after the publioation

ot that work, was toward a kind ot moniam, the seed8 ot whioh are
found 1n varlous aeotlon8 of the PSlchologl.

These early indica-

tiona of monism were, striotly speaking, a "phenomenism," somewhat 8im11ar to that of aenouvier and Mach, though not derived
trom their position. 11

After e1iminatlng both the "soul" and the

".elf" as entlties in his psychological poaltlon, James was ready
to deny "consoiousnesa" .a an entity, and thua olear the way for
the announcement ot his neutral moniam ot "pure experienoe."

At

this tlme he definitely shifted his allegiance trom Berke1elan
Idealism to realism:
With transition and prospect thus enthroned In pure experienoe, it is impo8sible to subsoribe to the idealls.
of the English sOhool. Radical empiricism has, 1n faot,

II,

364.

9 Perry,
10

~

Thouset

James, Principles

~

2!

Charaoter

~

William Jamea,

PSloholoil, I, 218.

11 Perry, The Thought and Character of Wil11am James,
II, 390: "James t 8 view ot experIenei, then, vaslnot aerIvea trom
oontemporary p08itivis. any more than from Renouvier. It was in
agre.ment with a feneral tendency of the t1mes} and it was the
oulmination of a endenof whioh had governed his own thought trom
early feara."
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more a££1nities with natural realism than with the v1ews
o£ Berkeley or o£ Mlll, and this can be easily shown.12
This monism o£ "pure experience" now became his dominant interest
and was characteristic ot much o£ hia later philosophy.

We must

keep in mind, however, that it waa a moniam onll in the epistemological sense ot a denial ot the dualism ot subject-object in the
act ot oognition.

Furthermore, Jama. held strenuously that it

was based on realism, not on ideallsm.

He consldered the monis-

tic idealists, such as LotZe, Royoe, and Bradley, as his ohie£
adversaries.

As Perry says!

He brings the same general charge against them all, namely, that they present philosophy with a talse dilemma
between utter unity and utter irrelevance. Lotze argues
that it two things are distinot, they cannot influence
one another; Royce, that 1£ two things are independent,
they can never become 1nterdependent, and Bradley, that
it things are two they cannot be related. The conclusion
is that since there is lntluence and relationship, implied
even in bare pluralitj, then distinctness and independence must be abandoned: onene.s must be the reality,
and plurality is the mere appearance. 13
Bere we see the "inte1lectuali.m" which was so utterly opposed to
James-s empirioal approach.

The unity maintained by the monistic

idealists was "cosmological" rather than epistemological.

Bence

James could, on the one hand, argue against their position that
"onen.ss must be the reality" and support pluralism in his cos-

12

II,

584.

Jaa.s, Esaala

13 Perry,

~

~

Radioal Empiricism, 76.
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~
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.

mology, and, on the other hand, ma1ntain the neutral mon1sm ot
"pure experience."
J . .e.'. 008mology tind. expreSSion 1n the Blbbert Lec-

tures delivered at Oxford in May ot 1908, and later published
under the t1t1e A Pluralistic Universe.

Perry obaerves,

There are two oonneot10ns between the metaphysics of
A Pluralistic Universe and the prat;atis. which preoeded
Tt. PIpst, tne former i. an appllca Ion ot the lattert
the pragmatiC .ethod. and standard ot truth are repeatedly appl1ed to the proot ot pluralism and the disproot
ot mon1 ••• Second, the latter is applied to the tormer:
that 1s, the pragmat1c account of knowledge aftords a
spec1al case ot the pluralistic metaphysics • • • •
Pragmat1.m does not merely prOVide a method which oan
be employed 1n metaphysics--it provides a metaphysics
ot truth whioh is consistent with that general metaphysios which James advocates, through bringing the entire prooess ot oognition within the tield ot possible
experlence. 14

--

-

In A Pluralistic Univerae James stated the thesis of the lectures
as "a detense ot the pluralistic against the monistio views."l5
He says, "Think ot the universe as existing solely in the eachtorm, and you will have on the whole a more reasonable and satiafaotory ide. ot it than it you 1nsist on the all-torm boing neoes
sary. "16

This pluralistic view of the univerae is obviously an

applioation ot Radical Empiricism in general and ot the prinoiple

-Jam.s,

14 Ib1d., II, 585.

15

---------- --------'

A Plura1ist1c Universe, 44.

-

16 Ibid., 44.

-

ot "pure
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exp.~lence"

the Many.
v.~se

.

or a

In

pa~tlcular

Is the world one,
p1u~lv.~8e?

O~

to the

p~ob1em

18 It many?

Do

ot the One and

-

we have a unl-

James &nswers this questlon In the tol-

lowing:
!he world 1. One ju.t so ta~ as Its parts hang togeth.~
by any deflnite connexion. It is many just so ta~ as
any deflnite connezion tal1s to obtain. And tlnally It
Is growlng mo~e and mo~e unitied by those systema ot
connezion at leaat which human ene~gy keeps t~am1ng as
time goes on. 1 7
Thia last reterence .e.ma to pertaln to the generalized concluaion ot Radical Empi~iCism18 In which we have the many subatantive
enced

pa~ts

of the experlence-continuum united by directly

~.lationa,

tinuum experience

or transitive parts ot experience.
p~esents

itself as a

"theate~

In this con-

ot simultaneoua

possibilities," trom whioh the mind, f.eling its way
an antenna, "carves out" its own intelligible

expe~i

torwa~d

wo~ld f~om

like

"the

17 James, Prasmatism, 156.
Cf. James, The Meaning ot ~th, preface, xli: "the
pa~ts ot expe~ience hold togetHer from-next to next by relations
that are themselvea parts ot experience. The di~ect1y apprehended univerae needs, In short, no extraneoua trana-empirical
connectlve support, but ~ossesse. In it. own right a ooncatenated
or continuous structure. Cf. also Pe~~7, The Thought and Character ot Wllliam Jamea, II, 590: "It Jame. wIined to e.cape the
PFicircal liplicat10ns ot monis., he wal not les. anxioua to eacape the theo~etl0 diftlculties ot atoDdam, monadiam, duallam, o~
any vlew in which unity was excluded in advance. He sought a view
which ~erm1tted unlty--a. much as theoretiC demands misht reqUire,
or as he tacta might 11e14, o~ as the ~eliglous consciousne ••
might crave."
18

76
jointle.a continuity ot apace and moving clouds ot awarming
atoma."19

Thia experience-continuum is an active, dynamic, aen-

sibly continuous tlux in which "every individual morsel ot the
sen.ational atream takes up the adjacent mors.ls by coale.cing
with them,"20 and "the concrete pulse. ot experience • • • run
into one another continuously and seem to interpenetrate.

What

in them is relation and what ia matter related 1s hard to disoern."2l

In this experience-continuum, a "'mind' or 'personal

consciousness' ia the na.e tor a serie. ot experiences run together by certain definite tranaitions, and an objeotive reality
is a aeries ot aimilar experience. knit by ditterent transitions."22

!!

psycholoSZ, I, 288.

19

laaes, Prinoiples

20

laa•• , A Pluralistic Universe, 271.

21

Ibid., 282 •
...........

- ----------- --------

22 Jame., Es.ays in Radical Empiricism, 80; ct. ibid.,
where he discusses thi various type. ot relationsl "RelatIOns
are ot ditterent degree. ot intimacy. Merely to be 'wIth' one
another in a universe ot discourse ia the moat external relation
that term. can have, and seem. to involve nothing whatever aa to
further consequences. Simultaneity and time-interval come next,
and then space-adjacency and distance. Atter th. ., similarity and
ditterence, carrying the possibility ot many interenc.s. Then
relations ot activity, tying terms into series involving change,
tendency, resistance, and the oausal order generally. Finally,
the relation experienoed between terms that torm states ot mind,
and are immediately conscious ot continuing each other. The organization ot the Selt as a system ot memories, purposes, strivings, tultilments or disappointments, is incidental to this moat
intimate ot all relations, the teF.ms ot whioh seem in many cas ••
to compenetrate and suffUse each other.s being."

44.
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Juat aa there i8 "no general stuff of which experience at large
i. made,"23 so too there is no "aboriginal stuff or quality at
being, oontrasted with that of which material objeots are made,
out ot which our thoughts of them are made."24

The passing

thought, "which is the thinker,"2S performs a function in experience which ia called knOWing. 26

"Consciousness" is not an entity

but "a kind of external relation, and does not denote a speCial
stuff

o~

way of being."27

The peoularlty of our experiencea, that they not only
are, but are known, which thelr 'conscious' quallty Is
Invokedto explaln, 1. better explained by thelr relatlon.--the.e rel,tlona themselves being experienoes-to one anothEtr. 2t1
The desorlption of the passing thought appropriating to it.elt
Ita predecessors and in turn b.lng appropriated by its suocessora
ls modlfied later 1n the Easall to a "co-conscious transltlon • •
• by which one experienoe passe. into another when both belong to

25

Ibld. ,
-Ibld.,
-James,

26

Jam.a, Essals in Radical !!Eirlcism,

23

24

26.
3.
PrinolEl.s

27 !!1.!!. , 25.
28

~.,

25.

-

.2!.

Psychology, I, 342.

4.
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the same s.lt."29

It will be noted that James slips into the

"dualistio" te!'m1nology of his PS12hologl, though he is using the
word "self" here to reter to the oontinuity experienced when

"8

later moment ot my experienoe aucceeda sn earlier one • • • • "30
He goes on to aay: "Continuity here is a definite sort of experienoe, just as definite AI 1s the discontinuity-experience which
I find it impossible to avoid when I seek to make the transition
trom an experience ot my own to one of yours."31

In his analysls

of the "stream ot thought," the first characteristic was that
each thought is "owned."32

And again, "Thoughts which we actu-

all,. know to exist do not tly about lao •• , but seem to belong to
some one thinker and not to another."33

!he Similarity between

the.e two analy•• s i. more obvious if we take into consideration
the taot that in the PSloholoil James was approaChing the ques·t1on

on the psychical plane through introspection whereas in the

later work he was con.idering the problem on the metaphysical
plane through observation.
29 Ibid., 47: James s.,.a: "About the taota t.here ia
no question. My experienoes and your experienoes are 'with' eaoh
other 1n various ways, but mine pass into mine, and yours pass
into yours in a way in which yours and mine never pass into one
another."

..

49 •
.31 Ibid •• 49 •
.30

~

32

James, Prinoi2 1es

3.3

-Ibid.,

330.

2!

PSloholo&y, I, 226.
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Not only are an individual's thoughts continuous, but
a180 "the objective nucleus ot every man's experience, his own
body"34 is continuous.

James continues by stating his opinion

that "equally continuous as a percept (though we may be inattentive to it) is the material environment of that body, changing by
gradual transition when the body moves."35
Thus by denying both the soul and entitative consciousne.s, on the one hand, and by analyzing reality according to the
"stream or thought," on the other hand, James suoceeded in breaking down the mind-body dichotomy into a neutral monism of "pure
experience."

By this theory he provided the American philosophic

world with a new epistemology and a new cosmology.
One may ask: Precisely where does James stand in the
Aaerican world of thought?

Is he, for all his novel ideas, only

another in the long line ot associationists?

That he did not

intend to develop an entirely new position, muoh l.s. to start a
new "sohool" in opposition to the already-existing school of empirioism, seem. likely from the following .tatement:
It [hi. poaitioq] is es.entially a mosaio philosophy, a
philosophy of plural tacts, like that of HUme and hi.
descendants, who rerer the.e facts neither to Substance.
in which they adhere nor to an Absolute Mind that cr.at.s
them as its object •• But it ditfers trom the .HUm1an type
of empiriCism in one particular which make. me add the

34

James, Bssay.

35

-Ibid.,

65.

in

Radical !!pirici ••,

65.
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epithet radlcal.36
Thi. "one partioular," as he go •• on to say, ia the inolusion ot

every d1reotly experienced element.

Hia ohiet objeotion to the

ordinarr empiricism had been ita tendency to stress the disJunctive elements in experience and to ignore the oonjunotive
elements.

It was on this very point ot relation. that he parted

company with his associationi.t predeces.or..

As Townsend ob-

.erves, "He correoted the atomi.m ot a.sociationist psyohology
and disoovered continuities in the mental life whioh Hume, with
hi. more rigoroua logic, had been unable to observe."37

It was,

as we have seen, the influenoe ot Darwin and Spenoer which led
lames to reject the "mental chemistry" ot the assooiationist
school a8 both untrue to the faota ot introspective exp.rience
and inadaquate to explain the mental prooesses.

This rejection

ot psyohic atomism va. definite, final, and oomplete, and Jam••••
aubstitute, the "stream ot thought," beoame tor subs.quent .mpiricists the acoepted .xplanation of mental proce •• e..

36 ............
Ibid.,

Henc.

42 •

37 Town. end , Philolophical Idea. in the UnIted Stat•• ,
lame., Bs.all In RadIcal !i~IrIcIsi; 4'i "Serkel.y's
nominalia., BUme'. Itatemint tbit vSa ever thinss v. di.tinguish
are .a 'loose and separat.' as it th., had 'no manner ot conneotion,' J .... Mlllts denial that aimilar8 have anything 'really'
in common, the resolution ot the causal tie into habitual
sequ.nc., John Mill's acoount ot both physical things and selves
.s compos.d ot disoontinuous po.sibilities, and the general pulverization ot all Experience by asaociation and the Ddnd-duat
theory, are .xampl •• ot what I mean."

142. ot.
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we may say that, although James did not intend to break with his
predecessors, he did in errect profoundly change the current
trends both on the psychological level, with his "stream ot
thought," and on the metaphysical level, with hi. "pure experienoe."
A second question which might present itselt i8 that
conoerning the epistemological problem.

Did James actually suc-

ceed in solving that problem by his theory ot "pure experience"?
On this point there is such contusion, both in the wr1tings

or

James himself and 1n the writings ot his followers, that any
direct answer i. impo.sible.

The theory ot "pure exper1ence" was

developed, a. all w111 grant, with one purpose 1n mind: that ot
solving the epistemological problem.

This singleness of purpose

seems to have been the root of the ditficult1e. which followed
the statement of the theory.

If lames had not been so eager to

apply h1s theory to the problem at hand, but had taken the t1me
to work out in detail its metaphysical imp11cat1ons, many ot hi.
difficulties and those of hi. tollowers would neVer have arisen.
The first of the.e ditfioult1es is found in the very
expression "pure experience."

This term 1s open to two interpre-

tationa, metaphysical and epistemological.

taken in the meta-

pby.ical .en.e, "pure experience" signifies a type of pure being.
Such an interpretat10n has be.n followed and developed by many
membera ot the Beo-real1st group, including EdWin B. Bolt, Ralph
Barton Perr1, and William P. MOntague.

Hore recently, Willi . .
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lavery made use ot this interpretation in establishing his position on "ooncatenism."38

James gives detinite indications whioh

would substantiate suoh an interpretation when, tor example, he
describe. "pure experience" as "plain, unqualitied actuality or
existence, a simple ...........
that."39

Again he says that it is "a torm ot

being whioh is as yet neutral or ambiguous, and prior to the object and subjeot distinction."40

In this sense, "pure experi-

enoe" .eema to be similar to the soholastic concept ot "being")
and it James had developed this novel inSight, it would have
given him a much-needed metaphYSical toundation tor his resultant
philosophio theoriea.
"Pure experience" taken in the .pistemo10gioa1 sen••
seems to be reality whioh

~

time at whioh it ia known.

be known, at that preCise aoment in

Reterring to this sen•• ot the term,

Jame. lays: "The instant tie1d ot the pre.ent is at all times
what I call 'pure- experience."41 ae attempts to explain this
38 William Savery, "Coneatenism," The Journal ot Philo·
XXXIV, Ho. 13, June 24, 1937. Mr. Saviri, aI.cussmg £he
co
ict between monism and pluralism, says: "At the beginning ot
the last deoade ot the nineteenth century the triumph ot moni ••
over pluralism seemed to be complete. Then came a turning point
in philosophy. Oharles Peirce proposed his synechiam • • • and •
• • William Jamea developed this into his theory ot coneatenation."
so~,

39

James, Basals

40

Perry,

41

: ..es, Essals in Radioal Empiriciam, 23.

II, 385.

~

~

Radieal !!pirici.., 23.

Thought

~

Oharaeter

~

William James,

8)
ve~7

ditficult concept in the tollowing passage,

whe~e

he s.ys

that. given portion ot experience
• • • taken In one context ot aS80ciates, plays the
part ot • knower, ot a state ot mind, ot 'consciousne.s t ; while In a dlfferent context the same undivlded
blt ot experience plays the part ot a thing known, ot
an objectlve 'content.' In a word, In one ~oup it
figures as a thought, in anothe~ ~oup as a thing. And,
slnce it can flgu~e in both groups simultaneously we
have every ~ight to speak of It as subjective and objective both at once.42
P.~t

ot the dltflculty in this

of the term

"expe~ience."

The

matte~

wo~d

comes from the connotation

is commonly taken in the sub-

Jective sense, .0 muoh so that it i8 extremely difficult to conceive in the

ab.t~act,

objectlve .en.e,

thing having the experience.

from a

apa~t

It i. doubttul

whethe~

pe~.on o~

a

James

himselt ever completely distlnguished in his own mind the notion.
ot "pure experience" and subjective

expe~ience,

and the tact that

he was continually accused ot subjectivism and even ot solipsis.
i. proot enough that this theory was anything but clear to hi.
re.dera.

As. consequence he was

to~ced

to spend the major

ot his time atter the appearance ot the article.
theo~y

ot "pure

expe~lence"

p~opounding

the

in detense ot the theory itselt.

To

cite only one example, Protessor

Wa~ner

mean subjective experience, and James
tor me ant.datea the distinction.
ous

~.ality t~om

whlch,

Ibld.,
............

10 •

pa~t

whe~.v.r

Fit. understood James to

~eplied:

"Pu~e expe~lence

It is M7 name

to~

your ambigu-

conceptually developed, the two

84
sot. of data come. b 43

Bere we see James appealing to the meta-

physical aspect ot hi. theory tor an explanation of the true
nature of "pure experienee."

Such a re-aa.ertion of its meta-

physioal nature olarifies the basic notion of "pure experience,"
but it hardly explains the difficult epistemological application.
In addition to the contusion arising from his terminology in the notion ot "pure experience," James clouded the
matter even more by continual lapa.s into the thought and expresaion ot his former idealism.

AI late as 1905 we find him toying

with the idea that perhaps his "pure experience" ia, atter all,
in lome s.nse subjective.

He lays, "Cal11ng the stuff 'experi-

ence' implie. that 1t lhould be e1ther witnessed or w1tnessable •

• •"44

This queation involved the d1fficulty ot explaining thol.

experiencea which were beyond the mental reach ot man.

They

would, James thought, oonsi.t ot further experienoeal but who •• ?
On this pOint Perry observe., "It would have been more oonsiltent
it James had rejected thia aa a tals. question.

Por it pure ex-

perienoe is prior to consciousness and selt, then the personal
pronoun is not applioable to it."45

II, 391.

43 Perry, Th. Thought and Character of William Jame.,
Perry quote.-a letter from James to Protes80r Fi£e.

44 Ibid., II, 756. The quotation i8 trom the personal

notes ot James

an

the Miller-Bode controversy.

45 Perry, Th. Thought and Oharacter ot William Jame.,
Brieter Veraion, 278.-----
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Thus we have seen the development at the "stream at
thought" tram an analysis at the nature at the mind-proce.s to an
all-encompasaing metaphysical setting tor a new theory ot knowledge.

We have seen the ettects, both good and bad, ot Jame.'s

eclectic education: hi. eminent readability, hi. richness ot
variety, his brilliant tlashes at insightf and on the other hand,
hia occasionally contused thought, somewhat disorganized development, and trequently inaccurate presentation.

These qualitie.

have made him what he i., namely, the best known and most widely
read American philosopher in the eye. ot the public, and at the
aame time a problematic enigma in the eyes ot serious .cholars.
James cannot be said to have founded any philosophic school in
the strict s8n.8, but on tne other hand he has perhaps had, directly and indirectly, more influence on American thought ot the
past fifty years than any other single man.

In his writings are

found both the final expression ot two centuries ot associationism and the seeds ot both behaviorism and

functionalism~

and

Jame. will remain, with all his detects and shortcomings, the
tather ot that reali8m which i8 characteri8tic ot American philosophy todaYe
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